THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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SIGNS OF THE TIMES

A Call to Action.

On April 30th a manifesto entitled 'A Call to Action' was published in the *Times* and other journals. This important document, which we give in full with the signatures attached, marks the feeling of disappointment and alarm which has been aroused by the increasing proofs of grave disloyalty to the reformed position of the Church of England which is being evinced by an extreme section of the Anglo-Catholic party.

On Tuesday, February 17th, 1925, the House of Clergy of the Church Assembly passed a resolution in favour of observing, under another name, the festival of Corpus Christi. This festival was initiated in France, in consequence of a nun's supposed vision, in order to emphasise the dogma of transubstantiation adopted in 1215, and to furnish a special occasion for adoring the Body of Christ in the consecrated Host. It was formally instituted by Pope Urban IVth, in 1264, when Juliana's vision was confirmed by a priest who reported that when he was celebrating Mass at Bolsena, blood flowed miraculously from the wafer after consecration. Again, on Wednesday, February 18th, the same House seriously discussed, though it did not pass, a resolution to give the Feast of the Assumption (described as 'The Falling Asleep of the Blessed Virgin') a place among the Saints' days, with Collect, Epistle and Gospel.

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These two resolutions in favour of adopting two most distinctive festivals of the Roman Church were moved by Dr. Darwell Stone, who is one of the leaders of the party which claims a monopoly of the title 'Anglo-Catholic.' The fact that both were strongly supported, and one of them actually passed, in the House of Clergy compels us to recognise a crisis which threatens to change the character of the English Church. For it means that the 'Anglo-Catholics,' having for years successfully defied authority, are now claiming to wield it, and to impose their will upon the Church as a whole. That they will succeed in their present enterprise we do not believe. But unless English Churchmen read the signs of the times and rouse themselves from their supine tolerance, the disaster which now threatens is likely to overwhelm us.

The cardinal issue at the present stage is one of authority. What is the standard by which the rites of the Church are to be determined? The earlier Tractarians were strong supporters of the authority of the Bishops, as the Trustees of Church tradition: but their modern successors claim to over-ride the authority of the Church of England by that of 'the Catholic Church.' It is important to understand the bearing of this claim. By 'the Catholic Church' they do not mean the Roman Church, for they repudiate the Papacy; nor the Greek Church, for they reject the compulsory marriage of parish priests; but a nebulous something which is not represented by any actual community. For a Catholic Church which is neither Eastern nor Western exists only in imagination. It gives no guidance, it wields no authority. In pleading its authority against the law and discipline of the Church of England, the 'Anglo-Catholics' are really claiming to be a law unto themselves. Indeed, it is not as a party but as individuals, each following his own fancy, that they have imported into the churches which they control miscellaneous rites gleaned from various ages and countries.

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Sometimes they explain that 'the Catholic Church' means 'the undivided Church before 1054,' whose doctrine and practices they claim to restore. The claim cannot be made good. The earlier half of that changeful period lends them little countenance. From the latter half, which is admittedly the darkest period in the history of European Christianity, they do indeed derive the cult of the Madonna and the Saints. But, after all, it is not to the dark ages that they are mainly indebted. Compulsory auricular confession was ordained by Pope Innocent the Third in 1215; the festival of Corpus Christi was instituted in 1264; the exposition and the extra-liturgical adoration of the Host, and numerous other rites, belong to the extravagances of modern Italian Catholicism.

English Churchmen have a right to demand that these men, since they call themselves a party, should agree upon their principles, should define them so as to disown extremists, and explain what is their relation to the Church of England. If they can show that in essentials they are loyal, minor differences need not be emphasised. For the Church of England has always been distinguished by a generous comprehensiveness. The Church of Colet and Cranmer, of Hooker and Andrewes and Butler, of Wesley and Keble and Stanley, is not straitened in her affections. She has a place and a welcome for a large variety of thought and observance. Evangelical in that she claims for the soul a direct communion with God through Christ, she is Catholic in the value which she sets upon the Ministry and the Sacraments. The zeal for truth which burned in the reformers has ever glowed in her, so that, more than other churches, she is able to enrich and enhance her faith with the truths of science and history. While exercising a wise tolerance in the sphere of opinion, she checks the extravagances of speculation by her steadfast appeal to Scripture. In the field of Biblical study her sons have always been among the leaders. The sanity of her teaching, the genuineness of her piety, the breadth of her sympathy, have won for her a secure place in the hearts of the people, so that she is in a noble sense national.

But the Church of England is not *indefinite*. She stands upon the principles of the Reformation, putting truth before tradition and testing later developments by the standard of New Testament teaching. She looks not only backward but forward. She therefore repudiates a number of mediæval doctrines and practices, whose evil influence has been amply

demonstrated by experience. Unless their utterances do them injustice, most 'Anglo-Catholics' regard the Reformation as a regrettable incident in the history of English religion, and desire to restore those very influences against which their fathers fought—Mariolatry, the Mass, the control of the priest over conscience, the suppression of private judgment. It is thus the main position of the English Church which they seem to challenge. Plainly, if her authority is undermined by appeals to the Middle Ages, she must lose her character and her reason for existence: she will inevitably and deservedly cease to be a comprehensive unit, and dissolve into a medley of sects.

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We are confident that the great majority of our fellow-Churchmen, however widely they may differ on other questions, are unanimous in desiring to maintain in her integrity the Church of their fathers. But desire is not enough: *there must be action, and concerted action.* For an inert mass is always at the mercy of an active and highly organised minority. If Englishmen wish to enjoy the privileges of their historic Church, they must show the spirit of their forefathers, who made it what it is. They must awake from their torpor; they must care more for truth than for peace; they must waive lesser differences and unite in defence of basic principles.

THE SIGNATORIES.

H. Lowther Clarke, formerly Archbishop of Melbourne; F. H. Chase, formerly Bishop of Ely; F. J. Chavasse, formerly Bishop of Liverpool; E. Graham Ingham, formerly Bishop of Sierra Leone, member of the Church Assembly; E. A. Knox, formerly Bishop of Manchester; E. A. Burroughs, Dean of Bristol; W. Moore Ede, Dean of Worcester; W. R. Inge, Dean of St. Paul's; A. Page, Dean of Peterborough; R. Waterfield, Dean of Hereford; J. E. C. Welldon, Dean of Durham; J. W. Willink, Dean of Norwich; W. L. Paige Cox, Archdeacon of Chester; Malcolm Graham, Archdeacon of Stoke; G. J. Howson, Archdeacon of Warrington; S. R. James, Archdeacon of Dudley; W. Stanton Jones, Archdeacon of Bradford; R. C. Joynt, Archdeacon of Kingston-on-Thames; J. H. Richards, Archdeacon of Aston; J. H. Thorpe, Archdeacon of Macclesfield; R. Blakeney, Canon of Peterborough; R. H. Charles, Archdeacon of Westminster; H. L. C. De Candole, Canon of Westminster; John Gamble, Canon of Bristol; M. G. Glazebrook, Canon of Ely; A. B. G. Lillingston, Canon of Durham; C. E. Raven, Canon of Liverpool; J. G. Simpson, Canon of St. Paul's; V. F. Storr, Canon of Westminster; B. H. Streeter, Canon of Hereford, Fellow of Queen's College, Oxford; Dawson Walker, Canon of Durham; R. A. Mitchell, Vicar of St. Michael's, Chester Square, Hon. Canon of Winchester; T. Guy Rogers, Rector of Birmingham, Hon. Canon of Chelmsford; H. A. Wilson, Rector of Cheltenham, Hon. Canon of Gloucester; J. F. Bethune-Baker, Lady Margaret's Professor of Divinity, Cambridge University; H. E. D. Blakiston, President of Trinity College, Oxford; V. J. K. Brook, Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford; C. F. Burney, Oriel Professor of the Interpretation of Holy Scripture, Oxford University; A. J. Carlyle, formerly Fellow of University College, Oxford; G. A. Chase, Senior Tutor of Trinity Hall, Cambridge; H. Costley-White, Headmaster of Westminster School; J. M. Creed, Dean of St. John's College, Cambridge; T. W. Drury, Master of St. Catherine's College, Cambridge, and Canon of Norwich, formerly Bishop of Ripon; T. C. Fitzpatrick, President of Queen's College, Cambridge; P. Gardner-Smith, Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge; Henry H.

Gibbon, Fellow and Chaplain, Balliol College, Oxford; H. B. Gooding, Principal of Wycliffe Hall, Oxford; R. T. Howard, Principal of St. Aidan's College, Birkenhead; J. W. Hunkin, Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge; R. H. Kennett, Regius Professor of Hebrew, Cambridge University; F. J. Lys, Provost of Worcester College, Oxford; H. D. A. Major, Principal of Ripon Hall, Oxford; D. S. Margoliouth, Laudian Professor of Arabic, Oxford University; M. W. Patterson, Fellow and Senior Tutor, Trinity College, Oxford; M. R. Ridley, Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford; C. F. Russell, Headmaster of Edward VI School, Southampton; A. J. Tait, Principal of Ridley Hall, Cambridge, and Canon of Peterborough; J. R. S. Taylor, Headmaster of St. Lawrence College, Ramsgate; F. R. Tennant, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge; A. V. Valentine-Richards, Fellow of Christ's College, Cambridge; E. M. Walker, Pro-Provost of Queen's College, Oxford; C. S. Wallis, Principal of St. John's College, Durham; E. W. Watson, Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History, Oxford University; C. T. Wood, Fellow of Queen's College, Cambridge; T. W. Gilbert, Rector of Bradfield, Berks; H. B. Gray, Vicar of St. Mary's, Bury St. Edmunds; H. W. Hinde, Vicar and Rural Dean of Islington; A. E. Hughes, Vicar of St. James's, Clapham; T. J. Pulvertaft, Vicar of St. Paul at Kilburn; Harold J. Smith, Rector of Gorton and Rural Dean of Ardwick; Buccleuch; Grafton; Ailesbury; Lincolnshire; Bathurst; Howe; Lindsey; Elibank; Lambourne; Violet Leitrim; M. Lindsey; L. A. Hollenden; Gilbert Coleridge; Archibald Campbell of Succoth, Bart.; Robert W. Dibdin, Kt.; Frederic G. Kenyon, K.C.B., Director and Librarian of the British Museum; Edward Clarke, Kt., P.C., member of the Church Assembly; J. F. W. Deacon, member of the Church Assembly; Henry Hobhouse, member of the Church Assembly; J. C. Hurle, member of the Church Assembly; T. W. H. Inskip, Kt., K.C., M.P., member of the Church Assembly; W. Guy Johnson, member of the Church Assembly; W. Joynson-Hicks, Bart., M.P., member of the Church Assembly; G. A. King, Kt., Master of the Supreme Court, member of the Church Assembly; Albert Mitchell, member of the Church Assembly; Charles J. Owens, Kt., C.B., member of the Church Assembly; Lulham Pound, Bart., member of the Church Assembly; Eugene Stock, member of the Church Assembly; Leonard Sutton, member of the Church Assembly; R. Williams, Bart., Treasurer of the Church Assembly; J. George Adami, C.B.E., F.R.S., Vice-Chancellor of Liverpool; A. C. Benson, Master of Magdalene College, Cambridge; F. C. Burkitt, Norrisian Professor of Divinity, Cambridge University; A. C. Clark, Corpus Christi Professor of Latin, Oxford University; A. B. Cook, Reader in Classical Archæology, Cambridge; H. W. C. Davis, Regius Professor of Modern History, Oxford University; G. R. Driver, Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford; Lewis R. Farnell, Rector of Exeter College, Oxford; Frank Fletcher, Headmaster of Charterhouse; Percy Gardner, Professor of Archæology, Oxford University; R. Gardner, Fellow of Emmanuel College, Cambridge; Arthur Gray, Master of Jesus College, Cambridge; A. Pearce Higgins, C.B.E., K.C., LL.D., Whewell Professor of International Law, Cambridge; M. R. James, Provost of Eton; R. W. Macan, Hon. Fellow and formerly Master of University College, Oxford; Beatrice C. Mulliner, Headmistress of Sherborne School for Girls; Cyril Norwood, Master of Marlborough College; C. W. C. Oman, K.B.E., Chichele Professor of Modern History, Oxford University; A. W. Pickard-Cambridge, Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford; F. W. Pember, Warden of All Souls' College, Oxford; A. L. Poole, Fellow of St. John's College, Oxford; W. Ridgeway, Kt., Professor of Archæology, Brereton Reader in Classics, Cambridge University;

Nowell Smith, Headmaster of Sherborne School; W. G. Bradshawe, C.B.E.; George A. Macmillan; John Murray; J. St. Loe Strachey, Editor-in-Chief of the *Spectator*; Martin Sutton; Austin Taylor, formerly M.P. for Liverpool; Douglas White, M.D.

The aim of the manifesto appears to be two-fold. First, it is directed to the episcopate with the purpose of calling their attention to the deep and widespread dissatisfaction which exists at the attempts which have been made in the House of Clergy to defeat reasonable Prayer Book Revision and direct it into reactionary channels. It is highly significant that the Evangelicals and Modernists have found themselves able to co-operate in this protest. Until now, where crises have arisen which involved the three schools, Evangelicals have combined with Anglo-Catholics against Modernists. In their attitude towards the Reformation, Evangelicals and Modernsts find common ground. Neither desires to see the Reformation basis of the Church of England overthrown; both regard it as a notable advance on mediaeval scholastic theology and liturgical corruption; and both are resolved not to go behind it. The Evangelical desires to rest upon it; the Modernist to advance from it. Hence they are compelled to oppose those of their fellow-Churchmen who would go behind it in order to secure union with Rome. In theory, we have no objection to union with Rome: we desire inter-communion with Rome as with all other Christian communions, but it must be a Rome which has abandoned its claims to dominance and infallibility, and that seems too remote a contingency to be considered at present. On the other hand, many liberally-minded Free Churchmen charitably recognise in present-day Anglicanism what a writer in the *Methodist Recorder* of May 14th calls 'a new breath, a new spirit, a new friendliness.' If, however, the Church of England falls into the hands of our Anglo-Catholic extremists, this will all evaporate. We shall have in its place an exclusive rigidity which will render all hope of reunion with the English Free Churches impossible. Our hopes of reunion with the Free Churches rest upon the kind of Prayer Book revision which is secured. If it be reactionary, we must bid them farewell. Although we do not suppose that a Prayer Book revision which looks forward rather than backward will succeed by itself in attracting back to the Church the large numbers who have ceased

to attend her services, yet it is obvious that it is a most important factor, and we hope most earnestly that the bishops who will be engaged on revision, besides thinking of the clergy and laity of the Church representative bodies, will think most seriously of the large body of nominal but non-practising Churchmen who are not represented, and also of the English Free Churchmen.

But the manifesto, besides being a reminder addressed indirectly to the Bishops, is also something of a challenge to the Anglo-Catholic party. Let us say at the outset we believe the great bulk of that party are loyal to the English Church and to the principles of the Reformation liberally interpreted. There are, however, a number of disquieting indications that there is a growing party of those who are really not Anglo-Catholics at all, but Crypto-Romanists. It is hoped that loyal Anglo-Catholics will definitely and openly separate themselves from such, and declare that the methods, and practices, and ideals of the Crypto-Romanists are alien and repugnant to the Anglo-Catholic tradition. English Modernists do not distrust Anglo-Catholicism; it is one of the points which differentiates the English Modernists from the Liberal Protestants. The Modernists recognize that a wisely-directed Anglo-Catholicism in the form of Liberal Catholicism is perhaps more in harmony not only with the organization and ideals of the English Church, but also with the needs of the English nation to-day than any other form of institutional Christianity; but they are equally convinced that a sound Anglo-Catholicism must be as loyal to the fundamental principles of the Reformation as it is to the ideals of Catholic order and worship and doctrine. To loyal Anglo-Catholics who will use them loyally large liturgical concessions are possible in the form of alternative uses. To Crypto-Romanists who are resolved to use every concession as a stepping stone to securing the whole Roman cultus no concessions are possible. We hope in the interests of such an ideal of Prayer Book revision as Modernists have advocated, and as the breadth and variety of our modern religious life demands, that loyal Anglo-Catholics will indicate by some form of public manifesto where precisely they stand, what is their aim, and to whose liturgical authority they are ready to yield loyal obedience.

Some will ask: Where does 'A Call to Action' lead? What action is intended? We may reply: No further action at all if the manifesto meets with the kind of response which is indicated in this article. As Modernists, our hope lies in education: education of the clergy: education of ordinands: education of the laity. Education will break down our middle-walls of partition and reconcile those whom ignorance keeps asunder. Enlightenment, not denunciation, puts to flight obscurantism and superstition. The only organization in which Modernists really believe is organization for education. Organization for political purposes must only be used where there is too little time to organize for education, or where education has been defeated by counter political organization. We hope there will be no need for organization of that kind. It is a poor substitute for education. Co-operation by 'all sober, peaceable, and truly conscientious sons of the Church of England' is what we need in the present crisis, and it is what we hope we may secure under the leadership of the English episcopate. If 'A Call to Action' is instrumental in assisting this end, it will not have been in vain.

A Free Pulpit and Fixed Liturgy.

'A Call to Action' has raised the question of liberty in the English Church. Ought not those who demand the restriction of liturgical lawlessness and protest against the rivival of mediaeval practices and the introduction of the Roman cultus into our Church Services to protest against Modernist teaching in our pulpits? Does not our English sense of justice demand this? This is the view of Bishop Gore. In a recent letter to the *Times* he wrote:

> 'It would prove impossible to restrain one clergyman from obtruding the Latin Canon into the English Service, and leave scot free another clergyman to proclaim his disbelief in the clauses of the Creed.'

To this contention Canon Streeter replied as follows in a letter published in the *Times* on May 16th:

> 'Bishop Gore . . . in his appeal to the English sense of justice, seems somehow to have forgotten the existence of English commonsense. Surely the main object of a fixed form of prayers is to protect the congregation from the vagaries of individual ministers, and to secure that the service is a noble expression of the considered attitude of the whole Church. If, then, a clergyman substitutes the Latin Mass

for the Church of England Liturgy, he deprives his congregation of that to which they have a right: they are not similarly injured by a particular interpretation he may put upon certain clauses of the Creed.

'There is another point. The problem raised by the language of the Creed simply did not exist for the framers of the XXXIX. Articles. At that date Hell was a place to which one could descend, and Heaven was another place to which one could ascend; Creation and the Last Judgment could be naturally conceived by educated persons in the literal Biblical sense implied in the Creed. But if this is no longer the case, it is because of new facts that have been discovered since and the change of outlook necessitated by these discoveries. It is otherwise with the fundamental issues which divide the English Church from Rome. In no important particular are these affected by anything that has been discovered in the last 400 years.

On the Roman issue the Church of England did once make up its mind, and that with the full knowledge of the facts. The Modernist issue had not then been raised; and, if it had been, the facts most relevant would not have been before the Court. The Roman issue is one on which, rightly or wrongly, the Church has given a considered verdict. The Modernist issue is one which has not yet come up for final judgment.'

If the pulpit is to carry weight, the preacher must have a large measure of freedom. Intellectual, moral, and spiritual, authority cannot be retained by a tuned pulpit or a tied preacher. Churchmen feel bound to attend public worship and to receive the sacraments, but they are free to leave before the sermon, and a number do not hesitate to do so. In the case of the services it is very different. While we favour authorized liturgical variation, if the parishioners desire it, we recognize that according to the English liturgical ideal public worship is not something which may be determined by the whim of individuals and altered in accordance with their impulses. It expresses the devotional mind of the Church as a whole.

The Anglican Mind.

The Review of the Churches for April, 1925, contains an article of very considerable interest and insight on 'The Anglican Mind' by Professor Carnegie Simpson, a Presbyterian. He discovers three characteristics of it. First, a notable respect for sound learning.

'Anglicanism has,' says the Professor, 'I do not doubt, a larger percentage of scholars in proportion to its size than any other church has, and it has never lacked some pre-eminent scholars. When I here say scholars, I do not mean theologians. The English Church, which is neither speculative nor what divines call "experimental," but is practical and ethical in its genius, has not done much original work in theology.'

It is worth noting that whilst Dr. Carnegie Simpson believes that sound learning has prevented the English Church from committing itself to unsound positions, he is of opinion that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has saved it in positions in which even sound learning would have failed.

The second Anglican characteristic is comprehensiveness. The Church of England has had to be in some sense Protestant, and in some sense Catholic, ever since the exigencies of the Reformation struggle determined its character. But the Anglican mind is comprehensive because the English mind is comprehensive. That mind abhors any doctrine being pressed to extremes. It believes in practical experience: it distrusts logic.

This brings us to the third characteristic of the Anglican mind. Its test is pragmatic. Does a policy produce good results, then it is right. Dr. Carnegie Simpson sees an example of this in the way in which our bishops are appointed. Nothing can be more Anglican than Pope's couplet:

> 'For forms of government let fools contest,
> Whate'er is best administered is best.'

Dr. Henson made the acute remark that the Scotchman is naturally Ultramontane, but the Englishman is naturally Erastian. What this really means is that the former is more influenced by logic than the latter. Hence, theologically the Anglican system is full of half-truths, and practically it is full of anomalies. The fools wish to abolish the anomalies, and to state the half-truths as 'either-or' propositions. When, however, the Anglican system is worked by typical Englishmen of the educated class it produces good results. Dr. Carnegie Simpson rightly suspects that this illogicality and vagueness may easily tempt Anglicans to be lacking in principles and in heroism. It certainly has kept the majority of the clergy from fanaticism, but the Vicar of Bray has never been a typical Anglican parson. It is interesting to observe how close Dr. Carnegie Simpson's conclusions approach from an entirely different angle those of Bishop Creighton as they appear in his invaluable paper on 'The position of the Church of England.'[1] We will cite but two passages from it:

> 'The formula which most explains the position of the Church of England is that it rests on an appeal to sound learning.'

[1] Published in *The Church and the Nation*, by Longmans (1901).

'The English mind is not fertile in definitions, and we are apt to rejoice in our freedom from the restraints of mere logic. The test of our institutions is their general adaptability to the work which they have to do. We judge them by the way in which they satisfy our own needs, not by the ease with which we can explain them to others.'

The Three Parties and the Bishop of Ripon.

Dr. Strong in his recent presidential address to the Ripon Diocesan Conference dwelt on the triune character of the English Church. He reminded his hearers that there are in the English Church, and always have been (we suppose since the Reformation), three elements or tendencies of thought. There is the tendency to emphasize the long history of the Church, and to give weight to precedent and authority. There is the tendency to rely altogether upon vivid present experience, and to distrust the appeal to authority. There is the tendency to submit the whole content of Christianity to criticism and to try to find out how far it and the grounds of our belief can be expressed in terms of modern thought. The tendencies which have led to these developments are not new, but the circumstances of modern life have tended to bring them under the notice of persons who at other times would have been unaware of them. This triune state, it is urged, is a serious menace to unity. To the trembling pessimist the Bishop replies as follows:

'You say these divergencies of opinion touch fundamental issues and that they have always been present in the English Church; is it not inevitable either that one must turn out the other two, or that all alike must be treated as equally unimportant? To that I would answer No. I do not think the Church will ever give its full message unless all these three types of thought are in it. No one of the three can make its proper contribution to the work of the Church unless the others are there too. The truth which the Church holds in trust for the world has more than one side and attracts minds of varying characters. You can see this at a glance if you look at the existing situation. All parties are perpetually protesting against the extremists on the other side; and why is that? It is because the extremist holds his one aspect of the truth without the qualifications which give it its truth; he brings all things indiscriminately to his one test, and he makes the others feel, whether intentionally or not, that there is no room for them in the Church except at the cost of absolute submission. Let me take an illustration. The tendency called modernism has as its fundamental impulse the desire to test the traditional Christianity. It has very grave dangers—and that is why I have chosen it for my purpose. If you say that nothing can be believed which does not submit to some particular kind of test, you may grievously shake the whole Christian system and cause acute distress. I do not deny that there is a real thing called heresy and that the dangers of modernism

lie in that direction. In the course of the last seventy years the whole content of the Christian faith has been subjected to searching enquiry from this point of view. But think how disastrously the Church would have lost, if it had succeeded in prohibiting discussion upon the authenticity of the Gospels and Epistles, upon the possibility of miracles, upon modern theories of the origin of species and the like. There has been acute controversy, not always well conducted upon either side, but I think I am right in saying that our theology at the present moment is all the richer because churchmen have been found to examine and still more to understand the questions raised. Both the other two tendencies in the Church are the better for it. The Catholic has a more vivid and less mechanical view of tradition if he goes to it with some understanding of the way in which tradition is developed and maintained. He has some reasonable chance of separating rightly the true from the false in the history of the past, instead of feeling bound to accept uncritically and in the lump all that satisfies some test which may be of quite external and accidental value. In like manner, those who cling most devotedly to the authority of the Holy Scripture, stand to gain on the whole out of the modernist development. They have to use new arguments in support of their convictions, and they cannot fail to be aware that many persons of the modernist kind hold views which they cannot endure. But their position is stronger than it was before the Modernist movement began.

I think, then, that in the Church we have to find room for persons who approach matters in these very different ways, and that the witness of the Church will be impoverished if we fail.'

Church Union in Canada Achieved.

'Much cry and little wool,' or 'many conferences and little to show,' is the prevailing comment on reunion proposals. At last, however, something has been achieved. On June 10th the Presbyterian, Methodist, and Congregational Churches of Canada will become the United Church of Canada. The struggle for reunion has been a hard one, and a number of adherents have refused to come in mainly among the Presbyterians. The doctrinal basis of reunion departs in some important respects from the Calvinism of the Westminster Confession, and this has given offence to old-fashioned Presbyterians.

Whilst no doubt the sense of the un-Christian character of Church division and the longing for a wider fellowship have been important motives in securing reunion, it is only right to add that the practical necessities of the case have also contributed powerfully to this end. The multiplication of small competing churches in small and poor communities seemed futile, especially to those who felt the pecuniary burden of their maintenance. To have four underpaid ministers, on four underfed horses, ministering to four scanty congregations in one

locality, when one minister could do it all more effectively, arouses the protest of the practical man who has insufficient theological learning and ecclesiastical partisanship to be willing to give his money to support such a state of things.

Quo Tendimus?

The two following comments on the present religious condition in this country are of interest.

The Roman Catholic Bishop of Nottingham in his pastoral letter (cited in the *Nottingham Guardian* of June 2nd) writes :

> ' No one can foretell what the immediate future has in store for Christianity in this country. As an organised system of belief and worship, it would seem that the old-fashioned Protestantism we used to know is well nigh played out. There is, however, within the ample bosom of the Establishment a large and increasing school of thought which is bent on introducing into the National Church many Catholic doctrines and all the external trappings of mediæval worship. Although, of course, the adherents of this party are, in fact, every bit as Protestant as their brethren of the Evangelical wing, they are doing a real service to the Catholic cause by creating amongst their fellow Protestants an entirely novel religious atmosphere and fostering in them a mentality similar in many respects to our own. For that we may be, and indeed we are, duly grateful to them. But whether or not England will acquiesce in a further period of schism under a new aspect by allowing its national Church to be altogether captured by these extremists is a thing which remains to be seen.'

Mr. Sheppard, Vicar of St. Martin's, Trafalgar Square, in a letter to the *Times* of June 9th, writes :

> As I see things, Western civilization will go up in the smoke of another world war long before Christianity, travelling at its present pace, takes possession. The real tragedy of the religious situation lies in the fact that while the churches imagine they are offering Christ to the people as the only alternative to chaos, they are doing nothing of the sort; instead they are offering one or another of the partial, entrenched and mutually antagonistic versions of His original and Divine wisdom. It is surprising that even those who cannot be thought of as hardening their hearts against God remain uninterested? If Jesus Christ were to return it is questionable who would be the more surprised. He at our values or we at His.
>
> There are times in history when courageous action is the only safe and right course to pursue, and I confess that I see little hope of the message of institutional religion either counting or prevailing in the large affairs of life until the leaders of Christendom summon their followers to ask themselves a question as solemn as this :—
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> In the light of the tragic failure of institutional religion to commend the way of Christ to mankind, can there be in the mind of God an alternative Church to any that now exist to attain to which it is our duty to bend, if needs be to breaking point, our own particular denomination, and may not that Church be for the world of this day the rightful and orthodox outcome of ' the faith once delivered to the Saints ' ?

> If the Ministers of religion, first of all within their own communion, would spend six months considering that question I believe that things might begin to happen to the glory of God the Father. Until then I am persuaded that the Kingdom cannot but tarry.

Both citations seem to us to be characterized by admirable common-sense. Perhaps we may hope that the Universal Christian Conference on Life and Work, to be held in August at Stockholm, will prove to be a great liberating, progressive, and unifying effort. It will contain representatives of the greater part of Christendom with the exception of Romanism.

THOMAS HENRY HUXLEY AND RELIGION

By Julian Huxley, Fellow of New College, Oxford, author of *Essays of a Biologist.*

> So far as the laws of conduct are determined by the intellect, I apprehend that they belong to science, and to that part of science which is called morality. But the engagement of the affections in favour of that particular kind of conduct which we call good, seems to me to be something quite beyond mere science. And I cannot but think that it, together with the awe and reverence which have no kinship with base fear, but arise whenever one tries to pierce below the surface of things, whether they be material or spiritual, constitutes all that has any unchangeable reality in religion.'

And again:

> 'I have never had the least sympathy with the *a priori* reasons against orthodoxy, and I have by nature and disposition the greatest possible antipathy to all the atheistic and infidel school.'

I wonder how many, if they are asked to guess the author of the paragraphs I have just quoted, would think of Huxley—Huxley the rationalist, the agnostic, the destroyer of orthodoxy's peace and quiet, the bogey-man of thousands of mid-Victorian homes. Yet it was he who wrote those words; and wrote these, too, in 1870, apropos of the new School Boards:

> 'I have always been strongly in favour of secular education, in the sense of education without theology; but I must confess I have been no less seriously perplexed to know by what practical measures the religious feeling, which is the essential basis of conduct, was to be kept up, in the present utterly chaotic state of opinion on these matters, without the use of the Bible. . . . By the study of what other book could children be so much humanized and made to feel that each figure in that vast historical procession fills, like themselves, but a momentary space in the interval between two eternities, and earns the blessings or the curses of all time according to its effort to do good and hate evil . . . ?'

The truth is, of course, that Huxley was essentially and deeply religious; but that this really obvious fact was completely masked for the average man of his day by his onslaughts on what that average man imagined an integral part of his religion, but Huxley regarded as a dead-weight, an obstruction to any true religion.

The fact that we to-day can wonder at the popular estimation of Huxley is a measure of the extraordinary change which has come over the whole of this field of thought since his time—a change to which he contributed as much as or more than any other single individual.

When Huxley was a young man, adherence to the Church of England was still a condition of entering College at Oxford and Cambridge. Religion in England meant Anglicanism or else Protestant Nonconformity, and Rome was still to the bulk of the population quite simply the Scarlet Woman. When he was at the height of his activity, between 1860 and 1890, conditions had somewhat changed; but none the less the Established Church was in an entrenched and dominating position which we can hardly picture to-day, the popular knowledge of other religions was negligible, the science of comparative religion had scarcely been heard of, and religion was in general still identified with a somewhat theologically-inclined Protestant Christianity. Any attack on any doctrine of that particular brand of religion was regarded as tantamount to irreligion.

Upon this scene, enter Huxley. He was by temperament a Puritan. He believed passionately not only in the advancement of knowledge, but also in an absolute Truth and an absolute Goodness, in hard work and rigid morality, in beauty of character and of art. The difficulties which he faced and overcame at the beginnig of his career, both with regard to his scientific position and to his marriage, steeled and fixed that temperament. When he had made such sacrifices in order to be able to pursue truth, the discovery that most people refused to accept it even when thrust under their noses, only sharpened his pursuit and his zeal in truth's service. His catholic taste, his immense voracity of reading, and his wide circle of friends and acquaintances prevented him from ever becoming narrow-minded through over-specialization. His professional acquaintance with the value of true scientific method in arriving, even if slowly, at permanent

results, made him contemptuous of those who swallowed conclusions on insufficient evidence and led him to adopt the position for which he coined the title of agnosticism. For instance, he writes :

> 'The philosopher founded in naturalism . . . is compelled to demand that rational ground for belief without which, to the man of science, assent is merely an immoral pretence.'

Our other chief character is a bomb—the *Origin of Species*, dropped on to the nineteenth century stage with so much deliberation by that great and quiet man (who had so nearly taken orders in his youth), Charles Darwin.

We all know the result—the bad blood, the ignorant invective, the invective of those who were not ignorant and ought to have known better, the outcry that religion was in danger : and the further result that Huxley felt impelled to enter the fight and to attack all that was untenable in the orthodox religious views of the time, particularly on the theological side. It was thus an accident that he was so much of an iconoclast, so much of a devil or bogey to the orthodox. His Romanes Lecture and many of his essays and letters testify to what constructive force he could have exerted in religious thought if circumstances had been different—a constructive force which would assuredly not have been less than that which he revealed in pure science or in education.

I propose here to give a brief account of Huxley's attitude to religion, illustrated so far as possible by quotations from his writings; and then in a second article to try to estimate what he would be doing or saying on the subject if he had lived to-day. I know too well how difficult the latter task will be, and how inevitably personal ideas and prejudices will intrude; none the less, I do not think it an unprofitable occupation.

In the first place, then, Huxley's destructive contribution to religious evolution was important. By concentrating his attack upon dogma and the belief in verbal inspiration, which he stigmatized as Bibliolatry, he helped very materially in freeing the vital core of religion from such superstructures, and in showing how unessential much of theology is to true religion. For instance, when he, under the guise of 'the Agnostic,' was attacked by Dr. Wace and told that

> 'it is, and ought to be, an unpleasant thing for a man to have to say plainly that he does not believe in Jesus Christ,'

he retorted by saying that the 'ought to be' implied

> 'a proposition of the most profoundly immoral character';

and continues:

> 'I verily believe that the great good which has been effected in the world by Christianity has been largely counteracted by the pestilent doctrine on which all the Churches have insisted, that honest disbelief in their more or less astonishing creeds is a moral offence, indeed a sin of the deepest dye.'

This point I need not labour: I would only remind my readers how necessary it was for him, in his day, to labour it.

As a two-edged engine, both destructive weapon and constructive tool, he was one of the first to perceive the enormous value of a science of comparative religion. In his well-known essay, *The Evolution of Theology: An Anthropological Study*, he draws a detailed parallel between the religion of the early Hebrews and that of the Friendly Islanders as narrated by Mariner—one of the earliest attempts to do what Sir James Frazer later so thoroughly accomplished. In his opening paragraph he gives us the following passage:

> 'With theology as a code of dogmas which are to be believed, or at any rate repeated, under penalty of present or future punishment, or as a storehouse of anaesthetics for those who find the pains of life too hard to bear, I have nothing to do; and, so far as it may be possible, I shall avoid the expression of any opinion as to the objective truth or falsehood of the systems of theological speculation of which I may find occasion to speak. From my present point of view, theology is regarded as a natural product of the operations of the human mind, under the conditions of its existence, just as any other branch of science, or the arts of architecture or music or painting, are such product.'

Substitute, in the last sentence, 'religion' for 'theology,' and you obtain as clear a statement as you could want of the standpoint of the modern naturalistic investigator of human biology. What is more, Huxley was in this essay of set purpose confining himself to theology, and undoubtedly would have approved of the application of the sentence to religion as a whole.

We then come to Huxley's position with regard to what many persons (mistakenly, I venture to assert) believe to be the central problem of religion, its necessary keystone—that of belief in a God. Here the ground had hardly been sufficiently cleared for him to see as we can see to-day, so that his views are of a somewhat negative character. None the less, he has left us some pregnant sayings. Still tinged with the spirit of the age from which he was striving to liberate himself and his contemporaries is, for instance, this passage, implying as it does

that God must be a supernatural *person*, in some relation like that of proprietorship to the Universe, a problem not to be approached by scientific methods (and therefore, for Huxley, one on which to be agnostic):

> 'Of all the senseless babble I have ever had occasion to read, the demonstrations of those philosophers who undertake to tell us all about the nature of God would be the worst, if they were not surpassed by the still greater absurdities of those who try to prove that there is no God.'

Later, in his essay on the School Boards, he wrote, with somewhat similar background:

> 'I do not express any opinion as to whether theology is a true science. . . . But it is at any rate conceivable that the nature of the Deity and his relations to the Universe, and more especially to mankind, are capable of being ascertained, either inductively or deductively, or by both processes. And, if they have been ascertained, then a body of science has been formed which is very properly called theology.
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> 'Further, there can be no doubt that affection for the Being thus defined and described by theological science would be properly termed religion; but it would not be the whole of religion. The affection for the ethical ideal defined by moral science would claim equal, if not superior, rights. For suppose theology established the existence of an evil deity—and some theologies, even Christian ones, have come very near this—is the religious affection to be transferred from the ethical ideal to the omnipotent demon? I trow not. Better a thousand times that the human race should perish under his thunderbolts than that it should say, "Evil, be thou my Good."'

However, in the other essay from which I have already quoted, the *Evolution of Theology*, he closes on a much more modern-sounding note:

> 'I suppose that, so long as the human mind exists, it will not escape its deep-seated instinct to personify its intellectual conceptions. . . . . It may be that the majority of mankind may find the practice of morality made easier by theological symbols. And unless these are converted from symbols into idols, I do not see that science has anything to say to the practice, except to give an occasional warning of its dangers. But when such symbols are dealt with as real existences, I think the highest duty which is laid upon men of science is to show that these dogmatic idols have no greater value than the fabrications of men's hands, the stocks and the stones, which they have replaced.'

Finally, let me quote one more passage which indicates very clearly the direction which his agnosticism was pursuing:

> 'If the diseases of society consist in the weakness of its faith in the existence of the God of the theologians, in a future state, and in uncaused volitions, the indication, as the doctors say, is to suppress Theology and Philosophy, whose bickerings about things of which they

know nothing have been the prime cause and continual sustenance of that evil scepticism which is the Nemesis of meddling with the unknowable.' (*Science and Morals*, 1886.)

To put it baldly, he was forced by the intransigeant attitude of Victorian orthodoxy first of all to think of God in orthodox terms—cruder terms, in all probability, than he would have arrived at if he had been free to excogitate the problem for himself, in quiet and on its merits; and, secondly, to adopt an agnosticism which was not passive, no merely fainéant intellectual gesture, but implied the positive immorality of attempts to draw conclusions from premisses which could not be known—the immorality, therefore, of basing a religion on the attributes of the type of God with which his opponents, or certainly the majority of them, confronted him. How he would have reacted to the problem to-day, with the more conciliatory attitude of the Church, with the new discipline of Comparative Religion at his elbow, and with the growth of the positivistic or naturalistic attitude towards the idea of God, is another question.

Meanwhile, we must close with the positive side of the account. Huxley had his beliefs, like every man who has had to find his feet after doubt, perplexity and hard fortune. What were they, and to what extent were they religious in the full sense of the term? As I have already said, Truth and Morality were his sheet-anchors. Although he was intensely susceptible to beauty, both of nature and of every form of art, he never seems to have understood the need felt by some artists for the erection of aesthetic truth or reality into the central and dominating principle of life. He could feel strongly enough about beauty to write:

> 'Physical science may and probably will, some day, enable our posterity to set forth the exact physical concomitants and condition of the strange rapture of beauty. But if ever that day arrives, the rapture will remain, just as it is now, outside and beyond the physical world; and, even in the mental world, something superadded to mere sensation.'

But I am unable to recall any passage in his writings where he even mentions the problem of whether for the creative artist the right and wrong of aesthetics are above the right and wrong of morality; and I am tolerably certain that, if he had, he would have indignantly repudiated the doctrine without troubling to discuss it.

Again, although he was perfectly aware of the emotional quality of religion as opposed to the rational (or the practical) quality of morality, and frequently distinguishes the two as 'affection' and 'science' respectively, there is no evidence that he was willing to attach any special value to what we are now accustomed to call 'religious experience,' even in its highest and most mystical flights—or at least any value in any way comparable to those which he attached to the intellectual virtues of truth and the practical virtues of morality.

Here, again, it is possible that he would have to-day adopted a different position. For one thing, his opponents were putting all their apples into the opposite basket—of theology and formal faith; for another, Darwinism had not worked itself out to its logical conclusions in philosophy. He had not yet been confronted with William James' pragmatic truth, nor Bergson's keen attack upon intellectual process as itself a product of the evolutionary mill, and therefore itself not merely limited but qualitatively different from other possible kinds of knowledge; or had biologically-minded anthropologists and philosophers fully and with proper background stressed the survival value, in man's evolutionary history, of the altruistic tendencies, nor attempted to trace in detail the evolution of morality.

I think it would not be unfair to say that he occasionally made abstractions of truth and of morality, that, in other words, he tended to deify them—although he certainly at other times subjected these gods to the most searching analysis. For instance, he could write:

> 'All truth, in the long run, is only common sense clarified';

and again:

> 'In whichever way we look at the matter, morality is based on feeling, not on reason; . . . goodness is a kind of beauty. The moral law, like the laws of physical nature, rests in the long run upon instinctive intuitions, and is neither more nor less "innate" and "necessary" than they are. Some people cannot by any means be got to understand the first book of Euclid; but the truths of mathematics are no less necessary and binding on the great mass of mankind.'

Yet at the close of his life, in that famous Romanes Lecture, 'Evolution and Ethics,' which contained his greatest single contribution to moral and religious thought, he nailed his colours to the mast. He started from the problem of evil, and, naturally, dealt with it *sub specie evolutionis:*

> 'After the manner of successful persons, civilized man would gladly kick down the ladder by which he has climbed. He would be only too pleased to see "the ape and tiger die." But they decline to suit his convenience; and the unwelcome intrusion of these boon companions of his hot youth into the ranged existence of civil life adds pains and griefs, innumerable and immeasurably great, to those which the cosmic process necessarily brings on the mere animal.'

Or again, with regard to various past philosophies and poems he says:

> 'The conscience of man revolted against the moral indifference of nature, and the microcosmic atom should have found the illimitable macrocosm guilty. But few, or none, ventured to record that verdict.'

He then proceeds to dismiss the theodicies which are the necessary result of assuming a beneficent divine power immanent in the world and conceived as directing its evolution—theodicies which he finds best epitomized in Pope's lines:

> 'All nature is but art, unknown to thee;
> All chance, direction which we cannot see;
> All discord, harmony not understood;
> All partial evil, universal good;
> And spite of pride, in erring reason's spite
> One truth is clear: whatever is is right.'

And this conclusion, from its inception with some of the Stoics to its Panglossic latter end in certain modern evolutionists, he dismisses as fitting for

> 'an inscription in letters of mud over the stye of Epicurus.'

From this he goes on to discuss in good earnest the bearing of evolutionary biology upon the problem:

> 'The propounders of what are called the "ethics of evolution," when the "evolution of ethics" would usually better express the object of their speculations, adduce a number of new facts and arguments in favour of the origin of the moral sentiments, in the same way as other natural phenomena, by a process of evolution. I have little doubt, for my own part, that they are on the right track; but as the immoral sentiments have no less been evolved, there is, so far, as much natural sanction for the one as the other.'

And finally he comes roundly out with his great exhortation:

> 'Let us understand, once for all, that the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it.'

Here is indeed a confession of faith. Of faith in the absolute value resident in man's intellectual and moral quests and powers; of faith in the significance of human life, and in part

icular of its ethical aspect; of faith in a great deal more than his opponents had been willing to credit him with. And yet to some t seemed a confession of the insufficiency of those ideas and nethods to which he had most conspicuously pinned his earlier faith, to which he had devoted most of the energy of his prime.

I think that in fact there does in this fine essay reside a certain unresolved contradiction; and I shall try in another article o show how, perhaps, he might have resolved that contradiction f he were living to-day. For the present, I will content myself vith pointing out that his attitude was conditioned in part by he fact that the evolutionary battle was still raging, and that nen had not yet had time to see the problem in clearest perspective, nor to work out many of its corollaries and implications; and, secondly, that he was confronted at every turn by heories, principles, and practices which, though to-day half-orgotten or completely mouldering, were then alive enough. There was the doctrine of perfectibility and of inevitable progress, which Herbert Spencer had optimistically carried on. There was the ferocious individualism of the *laissez-faire* school, vhich (even more successfully, though no less vigorously, than ther and mutually exclusive principles) was attempting to justify itself by pointing its finger to Mr. Darwin and 'nature red n tooth and claw.' There was the sincere but aggravating chool of 'reconcilers' like Henry Drummond, who wanted to ave things both ways at once. And there was Orthodoxy still eclining on her pillow of soporific theology and advocating ideas nd practices which Huxley thought both false and childish.

But I am running beyond my limits; and must close with a rief summing-up of my grandfather's position as it appears with whatever inevitable imperfection) to one of a later generaon who can only judge of him from the printed page.

He fought the joint battle of evolution and freedom of nought to such effect that Darwin, before his death, saw his rebrand theories age into respectability, and achieve not merely oleration but honour and praise; and that England is to-day the ountry of greatest liberty of speculation, of least acrimony beween science and religion. Unorthodoxy is no longer a stigma. Ve are not so much troubled by politico-religious problems as rance or Italy, nor by the half-baked Fundamentalism of the nited States. The time had come when the religious spirit had

to find new forms; to do that the old forms, or much of them, had to be pulled down; and Huxley found himself cast, by the lot of circumstance, for the part of puller-down in chief. So thoroughly, and yet with such lack of vandalism or of any destructiveness for its own sake, did he do his work, that we are already beginning upon constructive work for the new building which will inevitably rise upon the site of the old.

If it had not been for the violent temper of some of the leaders of the Church in the 'sixties, the constructive work might have begun yet earlier. But the Church chose as its attitude the obstinacy of Wilberforce with his ill-mannered taunts, rather than the tolerance and broad-minded searching for truth, new and old, of Kingsley.

Huxley, the chief spokesman of science, was not intolerant: he was essentially a religious-minded man. He was on terms of intellectual and personal intimacy with many of the leaders of liberal religious thought both within and without the Churches.

It is of real interest to ask ourselves how he would have responded if the spirit of Kingsley and Jowett had prevailed over that of Wilberforce and Wace. I believe that agreement would have been possible on many matters, and that a state of friendly neutrality, as at present, instead of active hostility, could have obtained between Religion and Science. But could there possibly have been full alliance? Could there have been agreement upon the central issue of present-day theology—the problem of God? When all is said and done, that was, and still is, the real issue. On that issue I do not think that Huxley or anyone else of his day could have pronounced. Neither the data nor the requisite background were in existence. Agnosticism on the one side, and either Authoritarianism or the appeal to unanalysed religious experience on the other—those seem to me to have been the only refuges possible to the parties, even if they had wished not to embark on open warfare.

Meanwhile, history ran another course. Looking back on that course, let us rejoice for the sake of the progress of humanity that Huxley was there, ready to undertake his task of beneficent destruction; and let us, in justice to him, realize that his was no partial spirit, but one to whom religion, like all other high human activities, was of vital concern.

THE REVISION OF THE COMMUNION SERVICE

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I DO not propose in this paper to range over the subject of Holy Communion as a whole, but to concentrate on the actual proposals for revision which are now being submitted to the Bishops. I shall therefore ignore the extravagant statements and claims which have disfigured the recent controversy. Only we ought to remember that the elimination of many extravagances is largely due to the liturgical skill of the Alcium Club, to the solid reasoning of Dr. Eeles, and to the constructive piety of the authors of the Grey Book. To them in a great measure we owe it that the proposals now before us are far more acceptable than any which at first appeared probable. These I will briefly describe, and then explain what I think should be the attitude of the Churchmen's Union. I shall be referring all through to the Measure of 1923 as amended by the House of Clergy. It was published last March under the heading C.A. 158.

First let me mention the changes to which I think we can all give a hearty, if not quite unqualified, approval.

For the reading of the Commandments the minister is allowed to substitute our Lord's summary of the Law.

The two prayers for the King are omitted as a needless anticipation of part of the prayer for the Church.

Between the Epistle and the Gospel it is allowed to sing a psalm or hymn or anthem. That is a return to an old and reasonable custom.

The prayer for the Church—wisely described, not as militant, but as the Catholic Church of Christ—is enriched by two paragraphs. One of these is a very simple prayer for the departed, the other a thanksgiving for the Saints, not only of the Church, but of all history.

The two deterrent exhortations, which have long been disused, are omitted, and the third exhortation amended.

The prayer of humble access, which at present interrupts the course of praise and thanksgiving, is removed to its proper place before the reception of the elements.

In connexion with changes in the prayer of consecration, the beautiful thanksgiving after reception ceases to be a mere alternative and becomes an integral part of the service.

The large numbers of the communicants on some occasions make it quite necessary to shorten the form of administration. The options which are proposed seem to me the best which can be suggested.

An alb with a vestment may be worn instead of a surplice.

Some other changes appear to me either questionable or definitely harmful.

The form of preparation which is prefixed to the service, besides being needlessly borrowed from the Roman Missal, is intended often to supplant the preparation which is a regular and valued part of the service.

Definite permission is given to reserve the Sacrament for administration to the sick. That seems to me right and necessary. But the addition of 'others who could not be present' might lend itself to abuses, and should be rescinded. It is true that the permission to reserve the Sacrament for the sick may be abused: but so may any other permission. And there is a sound principle of law that *abusus non tollit usum*. Prohibition, when it is not supported by the public conscience, provokes resistance, and so aggravates the evil which it is intended to check.

Another point about which we may feel hesitation is the amendment of some proper prefaces and the introduction of new ones. The amendments are, I think, really improvements: but the effect of such patchwork is not satisfying. The new proper prefaces, if generally harmless, are uninspired and therefore of little value.

So far, then, the revision has much to commend it: and a few corrections would make it thoroughly acceptable to the great majority of Churchmen. The main difficulty lies in the prayer of consecration, round which the controversy has centred. It calls for our earnest and reverent consideration.

We may begin by asking what are the chief elements which have been found, and which ought to be found, in a prayer of consecration. Looking to the liturgies of the first four centuries, we see that gradually four elements came to be recognised and embodied in them: memorial, consecration, com-

munion, sacrifice. Later ages, though they have varied the interpretation of these terms, have not added anything which may not be expressed by them. So I will assume the list to be complete, and try to show what each of the terms implies.

Since the Eucharist was a commemoration of the Last Supper, it was natural that it should include the acting over of that memorable scene. Very soon it became the rule that the bishop or presiding elder should recite the Lord's words of institution. That custom has remained and has never been challenged.

Yet there early arose a question about the signficance of the recital. In the Greek liturgies, which were earlier than the Latin, the consecration of the elements was connected with the invocation, or epiclesis, a prayer that the Word or the Holy Spirit would descend and bless them. This invocation formed the climax, and came at or near the end of the prayer of consecration. But the Latin mind, ever inclined to the concrete, preferred to regard the repetition of the Lord's words and the manual acts of the priest as the decisive moment. That is why in the Roman liturgy we find the invocation reduced to a few words and placed near the beginning of the prayer, so as to throw all the emphasis upon the priest's acts. I say his acts rather than his words; for the essential words, though printed in large type, are ordered to be pronounced inaudibly. Thus a very clear division arose between the Greek and Roman rites. The one makes the consecration centre in an act, the other in a prayer. For my own part, I have no hesitation in preferring the Greek form.

The purpose of the consecration, according to the early liturgies, is communion. And communion, St. Paul tells the Corinthians, has two aspects. He who comes to the Lord's table is observing in a spiritualized form a custom older than history. The bread and wine are symbols of the body and blood of a victim slain once for all. To eat and drink them rightly is to enjoy a spiritual union with Him. At the same time, the apostle tells us, 'We who are many, are one loaf, one body: for we all partake of one loaf.' Sharing a common meal is the immemorial symbol of kinship. So the custom of sharing the consecrated bread and wine creates an adoptive brotherhood between all the communicants. Thus there is a double reason why communion

should be emphasized in the prayer of consecration, not slurred over as in the Roman rite.

Fourthly, there is the element of sacrifice. There is perhaps no other word which is used so loosely, and in so many different senses. In the Old Testament it may mean anything from a hymn of praise to the slaughter of an ox: and the Christian Church has borrowed and confused all its various uses. I must mention four of these. From the earliest times to the latest the phrase 'a sacrifice of praise' has been current. It occurs in the Roman Canon and in our own prayer of oblation. Again, when a Christian of the first two centuries spoke of the bread and wine as a sacrifice, he meant that they were gifts offered to God as an acknowledgment of His gifts to man. Soon a third conception was added. The germ of it lies in St. Paul's words: 'Present your bodies a living sacrifice.' The developed thought was expressed by St. Augustine in a famous sentence: 'Man himself, consecrated and vowed to God, is a sacrifice, in so far as he dies to the world and lives to God.' That is probably the source of Cranmer's noble words, which are so familiar to us: 'And here we offer and present unto thee, O Lord, ourselves, our souls and bodies, to be a reasonable, holy and lively sacrifice unto thee.'

So the prayer of consecration, as it stands in the Prayer Book of 1549, recognised three forms of sacrifice offered by men—the words of praise, the symbolic gift, and the personal dedication. They are in the true sense sacrifices: for what a man is or possesses he can offer, and that alone. That shows the error of introducing a fourth and later sense of the word, which represents the consecrated bread and wine as a victim (that is the meaning of the word Host) which we offer to God. Man cannot offer that which is not his. We do indeed speak of Christ's death as a sacrifice, but not as a sacrifice offered by men. And, if His words be rightly reported, He called it a sacrifice of communion (for such were all covenant sacrifices), not of expiation.

With these considerations present to our minds, let us examine the prayer of consecration as it appears in our Prayer Book and in the two alternative forms proposed by the House of Clergy.

The form in the Prayer Book seems to have five defects.

(1) It is hardly a prayer, the bulk of it being narrative.

(2) It misplaces the invocation, and omits all mention of the Holy Spirit, thereby throwing the emphasis on the recitation of

the words of institution, and so lending support to the Roman view that the essence of consecration lies in the manual acts of the priest. We all know what use is now being made in our churches of that opportunity.

(3) Through the removal of part of Cranmer's prayer, all mention of the sacrifice which consists in the offering of a man's self disappears from this place.

(4) By using the word satisfaction, it implies an obsolete and indefensible conception of God's relation to men.

(5) By rendering διαθήκη 'Testament' instead of 'Covenant,' it effectually obscures a very important part of our Lord's meaning.

Therefore, dear as the familiar words are to us all, linking us to so many generations of the past, we cannot seriously maintain that this prayer requires no revision.

The first of the two forms proposed by the House of Clergy retains all the faults of the existing prayer, except that it slightly improves the invocation. But it has two distinct merits. It is a real prayer. All the latter part, restored from the Prayer Book of 1549, consists of prayer and thanksgiving, and by including the sentence: 'Here we offer unto thee our selves, our souls and bodies,' it emphasizes the true nature of the sacrifice which man can offer. Thereby it partly remedies the evil caused by misplacing the *epiclesis*. It contains one phrase which is perhaps ambiguous: 'We make *with these thy holy gifts* the memorial which thy Son hath willed us to make.' 'Holy' might be taken to imply that the recitation had already consecrated the bread and wine. But if so, that is only repeating what is implied in the whole structure of the prayer. It introduces no new thought.

Unless, therefore, we are prepared to condemn the form in our Prayer Books, I do not see how we can object to the use of this alternative, which is on the same lines but a decided improvement.

The second alternative form, which is derived from the Grey Book, comes near to satisfying all the requirements of which I have spoken. It is a real prayer, not dominated by narrative. It preserves the ancient order of thought, ending with the invocation. Though it does not include the whole of the prayer of oblation, it does give expression to the thought that we offer ourselves as a living sacrifice. It omits the words 'oblation and

satisfaction,' which have long proved a stumbling-block (particularly the second), and substitutes Covenant for Testament.

Though there are one or two sentences which one would like to see recast, the prayer as a whole is such as we should be thankful to have adopted. It is at once primitive and modern, containing all the necessary elements and presenting them in logical order and devotional expression.

What shall we say, then, of the whole service as it appears after revision? There are two things which we cannot but condemn—the introduction of the Confiteor and Reservation for others than the sick. If these be removed, I think we might welcome the whole. That is not saying that we approve every detail. But the Churchmen's Union stands for comprehensiveness, and for granting to all the same reasonable liberty which we claim for ourselves. That is the ground on which, years ago, we accepted the principle of alternative prayers, even in important places. If, as I have tried to show, neither of the proposed forms of consecration introduces any principle which has not already been recognised in the Prayer Book, surely there is nothing to prevent us from approving both.

When may we hope to do so? There are strong reasons why the alternative Prayer Book, when the Bishops have modified its occasional eccentricities, should be introduced as soon as possible. But the case of the Communion Service is exceptional. Though in the final result it has proved a better piece of work than any other part of the revised Prayer Book, the long and bitter controversies which surrounded its inception remain in men's memories and prevent them from judging it fairly. The majority of the laity, who know nothing of the history of the Prayer Book, and whom familiarity renders blind to the implications of its language and order, are still unable to see the need of revision. Irritated by the echoes of a controversy which they do not understand, they respond readily to any appeal which is made to their conservative instincts. It is only of late that I have realised how common that state of mind is, and what opportunities it affords to agitators. Therefore, while I regard the revised service as a great improvement upon the old, and desire to see it come into use, I do not think it would be wise to adopt it until public opinion has been educated by the experience which the rest of the revised Prayer Book will afford.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS HARDY

THE problem of the existence of evil, the connection between suffering and sin, the 'incongruity of penalising the irresponsible,' the reason for the rude shocks inflicted on a struggling humanity which bring no resultant good in their train—these and the like problems are as old as man. Their mystery remains unsolved, and to some this insolubility has not been a cause of sadness. To these, the burden of faith necessary to feel a benignant creative mind working behind the problems of life has not been too heavy; among such must be numbered many of the great names in history. To others, perhaps equally great, this faith has not been possible; these too have faced the struggle seeking the way to the light, but with despair in their hearts. In this class may be placed Mr. Thomas Hardy.

The cry of 'Pessimist' has so often been hurled at Mr. Hardy that it is well to ask what measure of truth there may be in the charge. In *An Imaginative Woman*, one of the Wessex Tales, Mr. Hardy says of Robert Trewe that

> 'he was a pessimist in so far as that character applies to a man who looks at the worst contingencies as well as the best in the human condition.'

Or, as it is expressed in a poem entitled *In Tenebris*:

> '. . . if way to the Better there be, it exacts a full look at the Worst.'

This, says Mr. Hardy, is

> 'the exploration of reality and its frank recognition, stage by stage along the survey, with an eye to the best consummation possible; briefly, evolutionary meliorism.'

Neither does Mr. Hardy merit the charge, often brought against him, that he sets out to find the dark sides of life and shuts his eyes to its brighter aspects:

> 'I am like a gazer who should mark
> An inland company
> Standing upfingered, with 'Hark! Hark!
> The glorious distant sea!'
> And feel, 'Alas, 'tis but yon dark
> And wind-swept pine to me!'

Yet I would bear my shortcomings
With meet tranquillity,
But for the charge that blessed things
I'd liefer not have be.
O, doth a bird deprived of wings
Go earth-bound wilfully!

That the conclusions he draws are what are commonly called gloomy is due in part to the fact that he surveys the world as an individualist. His own temperament and the circumstances of his life have both led to the development of his mind on individualistic lines. He feels the solitariness of human life. This appears in the walks of Tess at night to avoid her fellow-beings:

'She had no fear of the shadows; her sole idea seemed to be to shun mankind—or rather that cold accretion called the world, which, so terrible in the mass, is so unformidable, even pitiable, in its units.'

And again we see it in Cytherea Graye's remark in *Desperate Remedies*:

'Nobody can enter into another's nature truly, that's what is so grievous.'

For Mr. Hardy the world has not been evolved by a conscious force. This seems to be the essence of his belief; the First Cause is unconscious. The Wessex Novels, studied chronologically, might show that he did not always hold this view. Some of the earlier stories, in which the irony of circumstance is strongly marked—as, for example, *Desperate Remedies*—indicate that at one time he felt inclined to believe that there is a conscious malignant force directly responsible for the evils of life, such as that which controls the movements of the characters in some of the Greek tragedies, but such a malignant force is only vaguely hinted at, and the idea disappears entirely as his opinions become more clearly defined. Thus in a poem entitled *Hap*, written as early as 1866, this idea of the unconscious force is already present in Mr. Hardy's mind:

'If but some vengeful god would call to me
From up the sky, and laugh: 'Thou suffering thing,
Know that thy sorrow is my ecstasy,
That thy love's loss is my hate's profiting!'

Then would I bear it, clench myself, and die,
Steeled by the sense of ire unmerited;
Half-eased in that a Powerfuller than I
Had willed and meted me the tears I shed.

But not so. How arrives it joy lies slain,
And why unblooms the best hope ever sown?
—Crass Casualty obstructs the sun and rain,
And dicing Time for gladness casts a moan. . . .
These purblind Doomsters had as readily strown
Blisses about my pilgrimage as pain.'

Every reader of Mr. Hardy's poems will be aware that this idea appears many times. I cite but one more example, from *The Blow*:

'And if it prove that no man did,
And that the Inscrutable, the Hid,
Was cause alone
Of this foul crash our lives amid,

I'll go in due time, and forget
In some deep graveyard's oubliette
The thing whereof I groan,
And cease from troubling; thankful yet

Time's finger should have stretched to show
No aimful author's was the blow
That swept us prone,
But the Immanent Doer's That doth not know.'

In *The Dynasts* the Immanent Will is seen as the controlling force pervading the whole sphere of life. To illustrate this point, it will suffice to quote the opening lines, where the Shade of the Earth asks:

'What of the Immanent Will and Its designs?'

and the Spirit of the Years replies:

'It works unconsciously, as heretofore,
Eternal artistries in Circumstance,
Whose patterns, wrought by rapt aesthetic rote,
Seem in themselves Its single listless aim,
And not their consequence.'

This unconscious force, the Immanent Will, is, then, the driving force in every living thing. The Immanent Will in Man is the Immanent Will in Nature, and all nature is, like man, the driven subject of the Will. Thus Mr. Hardy sees in nature a fellow-sufferer with man:

'The wind blew words along the skies
And these it blew to me
Through the wide dusk: 'Lift up your eyes,
Behold this troubled tree,
Complaining as it sways and plies;
It is a limb of thee.

'Yea, too, the creatures sheltering round—
Dumb figures wild and tame,
Yea, too, thy fellows who abound—
Either of speech the same
Or far and strange—black, dwarfed and browned,
They are stuff of thy own frame.'

I moved on in a surging awe
Of inarticulateness
At the pathetic Me I saw
In all his huge distress,
Making self-slaughter of the law
To kill, break, or suppress.' [1]

We may take as another example what many consider the finest piece of descriptive writing to be found in Mr. Hardy's works, Egdon Heath, in *The Return of the Native*. Is it not its human quality that makes the Heath so real? It is not only a grand piece of scenery vividly described by one who knows it like his own home, but there is in the description the thought of the link binding a long-suffering humanity and 'the great inviolate place,' beaten by the rain, swept by the wind, yet ever showing the same face to the skies:

'It was at present a place perfectly accordant with man's nature—neither ghastly, hateful, nor ugly; neither commonplace, unmeaning, nor tame; but, like man, slighted and enduring; and withal singularly colossal and mysterious in its swarthy monotony. As with some persons who have long lived apart, solitude seemed to look out of its countenance. It had a lonely face, suggesting tragical possibilities.'

It is not that Mr. Hardy regards the animal creation and lesser forms of life as suffering in the same degree as man suffers from the workings of the Unconscious Will. Happily for them, these lower forms of life are not cursed with consciousness of these workings; but man, being conscious thereof, *is* able to see, and what he sees is the same force at work in nature as that which controls his own actions. His sadder lot arises from the fact of his knowledge. Man is the highest form of life that the Will has yet evolved, and in him it has evolved what apparently does not exist in other forms of life, a consciousness, that is, a mind. How has this consciousness arisen? How is it that an Unconscious Force has evolved a conscious will? Mr. Hardy offers no adequate explanation, and this must seem to be a serious weakness in his philosophy. His explanation is that con-

[1] Cf. *The Woodlanders*. Pocket Ed.: p. 62.

sciousness in man is the work of inexplicable chance. So, in *The Dynasts*, the Spirit of the Years answers the question:

> 'The cognizance ye mourn, Life's doom to feel,
> If I report it meetly, came unmeant,
> Emerging with blind gropes from impercipience
> By listless sequence—luckless, tragic chance.'

And again:

> '. . . Our readings Why and Whence
> Are but the flower of Man's intelligence;
> And that but an unreckoned incident
> Of the all-urging Will, raptly magnipotent.'

I have been unable to find any passage, either in the Novels or in the Poems, which suggests any other answer than that consciousness in man is the work of chance.

Moreover, man has acquired this consciousness only to learn that his own existence is something which he cannot control:

> 'Part is mine of the general Will,
> Cannot my share in the sum of sources
> Bend a digit the poise of forces
> And a fair desire fulfil?'

We may compare the following passage from *Jude the Obscure*:

> 'Vague and quaint imaginings had haunted Sue [Bridehead] in the days when her intellect scintillated like a star, that the world resembled a stanza or melody composed in a dream; it was wonderfully excellent to the half-aroused intelligence, but hopelessly absurd at the full waking; that the First Cause worked automatically like a somnambulist, and not reflectively like a sage; that at the framing of the terrestrial conditions there seemed never to have been contemplated such a development of emotional perceptiveness among the creatures subject to those conditions as that reached by thinking and educated humanity.'

It is from the inevitable struggle that follows in the life of man that the greatness of Mr. Hardy's tragedies springs. Many of the Novels are the stories of men and women in whom the efforts to go forward, in the light of the knowledge revealed to them through their consciousness, have failed because they are not free, but ever driven and compelled by the Will within them.[2] For Mr. Hardy, the greater the development of consciousness in man, the clearer the perception of this hopeless struggle in life and the consequent sadness resulting therefrom. The more ignorant man is, the happier he will be. 'He that in-

[2] Perhaps the most dramatic examples are those of Michael Henchard in *The Mayor of Casterbridge*, and Jude Fawley in *Jude the Obscure*.

creaseth knowledge, increaseth sorrow.' In the Wessex Novels the happiest characters are to be found amongst the rustics, among those who have travelled but a short distance along the way which divides the impercipience of the primitive from the full consciousness in the mind of the most highly developed man. The Immanent Will itself, being unconscious, works towards no definite end, good or bad: It creates not knowing what It creates, It moves and compels Its creatures not knowing why or whither:

> 'Nay, blame not! For what judgment can ye blame?
> In that immense unweeting Mind is shown
> One far above forethinking; processive,
> Yet superconscious; a Clairvoyancy
> That knows not what It knows, yet works therewith.'

Since the Will has no knowledge of good and evil, it follows that all ethical and moral laws are human figments. The mind of man has evolved a knowledge of right and wrong, of good and evil, as part of his consciousness. That is to say, man as a moral being is on a higher plane than the Will that controls him:

> 'Then he: "My labours—logicless—
> You may explain; not I:
> Sense-sealed I have wrought, without a guess
> That I evolved a Consciousness
> To ask for reasons why.
>
> Strange that ephemeral creatures who
> By my own ordering are,
> Should see the shortness of my view,
> Use ethic tests I never knew,
> Or made provision for!'

Often, it seems, Mr. Hardy has felt with despair the hopelessness of man's efforts, but he always insists on the necessity for continuing those efforts. As Mr. J. C. Squire said in a criticism of *Late Lyrics and Earlier*:

> 'Whatever else, in his ratiocination, he may have missed, he has at least preserved always his passion for life, his belief that the game, even if it must end invariably in defeat, must be played to the end.'

It may not be a very happy picture of man's lot on earth, but it has a peculiar grandeur of its own in that it depicts the potential nobility of man persisting through a deathless struggle against almost hopeless odds.

The one characteristic of the Will is that it is ever driving on, ever being and becoming. Now one of the chief manifesta-

CONFERENCE OF MODERN CHURCHMEN

Oxford 1925

SUBJECT:

The Faith of a Modern Churchman

THE Conference will be held in Oxford from *August 24th—31st.* The meetings will be in the Debating Hall at **the Union,** by kind permission of the President and Standing Committee, who also offer the privileges of temporary membership to men attending the Conference.

The Conference will be open to members of the Churchmen's Union, and also as far as space will allow to those who are in sympathy with its principles and objects.

Accommodation will be provided at **Somerville College** and at **St. Hugh's** from Monday **afternoon,** August 24th, until Monday **morning,** August 31st.

Owing to the large numbers who now attend the Conferences, it is no longer found practicable for members of the committee to allot the rooms. This will therefore be done by the College authorities, **but all correspondence should be sent to the Hon. Secretary to the Conference Committee.** As a general rule members of the 1924 Conference who stayed at St. Hugh's will be given rooms at Somerville and *vice versa.* But owing to the difficulty of allotting rooms beforehand, all members of the Conference should on their arrival in Oxford, make enquiries at Somerville.

The Committee Room and Office will be at Somerville, which is half-way between St. Hugh's and the Union.

Tickets (including board and lodging) will be £3 15s. 0d. for the week, £2 15s. 0d. for the first five days; non-members of the Churchmen's Union an additional 10/-. *If not paid before August 1st an extra charge of 5/- will be made.* A limited number of persons finding their own accommodation may have meals in college at a reasonable charge. **Tickets for the meetings** only will be 15/-; for those engaged in teaching 7/6. Admission to single meetings 2/-.

Only under very exceptional circumstances can rooms be booked for fewer than five days, or money be refunded should they be occupied for a shorter period.

Railway Fares. The railway companies are unable to issue tickets at a reduced rate, as last year only 131 members availed themselves of the privilege, the minimum being 200.

Omnibus Service. The ordinary services on the Banbury and the Woodstock Road will be supplemented by additional 'buses between the two Colleges and the Union, both before and after the meetings.

Tennis. A small charge will be made for the use of the courts and balls.

Application for Tickets may be made to the Hon. Secretary after June 1st. It is requested that a cheque and a stamped addressed envelope should be enclosed.

(Miss) DORA NUSSEY,
Upper Ewe Croft, Ilkley, Hon. Secretary.

The Twelfth Modern Churchmen's Conference

THE FAITH OF A MODERN CHURCHMAN

MONDAY, August 24th.

Evening. Presidential Address:
Faith and Reason.
The Dean of St. Paul's

TUESDAY, August 25th.

Morning. **Why we believe in God.**
Prof. Caldecott, D.D.
What we believe about God.
J. S. Bezzant, M.A.

Evening. **Superstition.**
Alfred Fawkes, M.A.

WEDNESDAY, August 26th.

Morning. **What we believe about Man.**
(*a*) His Nature.
J. C. Hardwick, M.A., B.Sc.
(*b*) His Needs.
Hubert Handley, M.A.

Evening. (*c*) His Hopes.
W. M. Pryke, B.D.

THURSDAY, August 27th.

Morning. **Why we believe in Jesus Christ.**
Prof. Bethune-Baker, D.D.
Miss Maude Royden

Evening. **What we believe about the ethic of the Kingdom.**
Prof. Sorley, Litt.D., LL.D.
Douglas White, M.D.

FRIDAY, August 28th.

Morning. **Why we are members of the Church of Christ.**
R. G. Parsons, D.D.

Why we are members of the Church of England.
T. F. Royds, B.D.

Evening. **Why we value the Scriptures.**
Canon M. G. Glazebrook, D.D.

SATURDAY, August 29th.

Morning. **Why we value the Sacraments.**
(*a*) Baptism and Confirmation.
H. D. A. Major, D.D.

(*b*) Eucharist.
The Bishop of Birmingham.

Evening. **Are Modern Churchmen dishonest?**
Prof. Percy Gardner, D.Litt., LL.D., F.B.A.
Sir Arthur Hort, Bt., M.A.

SUNDAY, August 30th.

Morning Service at Christ Church Cathedral at 10 a.m.
Preacher: Rev. W. W. Longford, D.D.

Evening Service at St. Mary the Virgin at 6-30 p.m.
Preacher: Rev. L. Elliot Binns, B.D.
(late Hulsean Lecturer at Cambridge).

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tions of this continual movement is found in that I must call, for want of a better name, 'the appetite for life,' that is the Life Force in man and in woman, in animal and in plant, and in all nature. It is expressed chiefly in the desire to reproduce, to create, to continue the species. Here is a verse taken from a poem entitled *The Unborn*:

> 'And as I silently retired
> I turned and watched them still,
> And they came helter-skelter out,
> Driven forward like a rabble rout
> Into the world they had so desired,
> By the all-immanent Will.'

It is his belief in this appetite for life that leads him to attach such importance to the relationship between the sexes. But this appetite for life is only a part, or manifestation, of the general Will, and accordingly it, too, works unconsciously towards no definite end. The fact that man is conscious of this compelling force within him makes no difference to its working; he cannot control it, but must stand a helpless witness to the disasters which may not, but often do, follow in its train. So Mr. Hardy speaking of the meeting of Tess with Alec D'Urberville:

> 'In the ill-judged execution of the well-judged plan of things the call seldom produces the comer, the man to love rarely coincides with the hour for loving. Nature does not often say "See!" to her poor creature at a time when seeing can lead to happy doing; or reply "Here!" to a body's cry of "Where?" till the hide-and-seek has become an irksome, outworn game. We may wonder whether at the acme and summit of the human progress these anachronisms will be corrected by a finer intuition, a closer inter-action of the social machinery than that which now jolts us round and along; but such completeness is not to be prophesied, or even conceived as possible. Enough that in the present case, as in millions, it was not the two halves of a perfect whole that confronted each other at the perfect moment; a missing counterpart wandered independently about the earth, waiting in crass obtuseness till the late time came. Out of which maladroit delay sprang anxieties, disappointments, shocks, catastrophies, and passing-strange destinies.'

Mr. Hardy's supreme example of the misfortunes that may follow in the train of this appetite for life is that of Jude. For all his stupendous efforts he cannot control the Will within him.

This idea of the appetite for life, whether in the novels or in the poems, is naturally much more a matter of impressions than of definite statements. The nearest approach to such statements occurs in *Tess of the D'Urbervilles*, where it is said of

Angel Clare on his return to his home after the first happy months at Talbothays Dairy:

> 'Latterly he had seen only Life, felt only the great passionate pulse of existence, unwarped, uncontorted by those creeds which futilely attempt to check what wisdom would be content to regulate.'

And again of Tess after her consent to marry Clare:

> 'She might as well have agreed at first. The 'appetite for joy' which pervades all creation, that tremendous force which sways humanity to its purpose, as the tide sways the helpless weed, was not to be controlled by vague lucubrations over the social rubric.'

Does Mr. Hardy offer us any solution of the problems raised? Can man's efforts be so directed as to secure for him a modicum of happiness in his hasty passage through this somewhat 'sorry world'?

Dr. Hedgecock, in his book on Thomas Hardy,[3] says of *Jude the Obscure* that it may be considered 'as a dramatic exposition of the ideas of Schopenhauer and Hartmann on the gradual progress of the human race towards the denial of the will to live.' For Schopenhauer, this was the highest virtue, 'That the intellect should free itself from desire and willing and pierce the Veil of Illusion which hides from us the supra-sensible, so that the Will is reduced to its original state of quiescence or potency. Remove the Will from Life, and there is no more.'[4]

Such a doctrine, though perhaps the logical outcome of Mr. Hardy's ideas, is really antagonistic to his conception of the nobility of man's struggles. His message, backed by no great hopes for the future, is still 'Be strong and of a good courage,' and the passage which follows is best interpreted as the product of those periods of despair when 'the burden of the mystery' of this world has become for the moment intolerable; but they are not the abiding impression of a study of Mr. Hardy's works. So of Tess:

> 'Sheer experience had already taught her that, in some circumstances, there was one thing better than to lead a good life, and that was to be saved from leading any life whatever. Like all who have been previsioned by suffering, she could . . . hear a penal sentence in the fiat, 'You shall be born,' particularly if addressed to potential issue of hers.'[5]

[3] *Thomas Hardy, Penseur et Artiste.*

[4] Chambers' Encyclop.; Art: Schopenhauer.

[5] *Cf. Time's Laughingstocks: 'Before life and after.'*

A different solution appears in *The Dynasts*. It is the possibility of the Immanent Will becoming conscious at some future time, and so cognizant of moral laws, its efforts may be directed towards a definite end, fulfilling the idea of a benignant creation. The Spirit of the Pities breathes this hope which, however faint it may become, never entirely deserts man :

> 'Thou arguest still the Inadvertent Mind—
> But, even so, shall blankness be for aye?
> Men gained cognition with the flux of time,
> And wherefore not the Force informing them?'

and the great drama ends on the same note :

> 'But—a stirring thrills the air
> Like to sounds of joyance there
> That the rages
> Of the ages
> Shall be cancelled, and deliverance offered from the darts that were,
> Consciousness the Will informing, till It fashion all things fair!'

But whether or not such a hope is to be fulfilled in the future that lies before the human race, life has to be lived here and now. Man must continue the struggle. Individuals die, but the race of man does not die, at least not until some date as yet too distant for human comprehension, and for the race there can be no rest. It is just here that the courage of Mr. Hardy's mind is revealed, for though to him there is not much reason to hope for a better state of things in the future, he insists on every effort being made that may lighten the burden in the present :

> 'Happily,' says Mr. Hardy in the Apology to *Late Lyrics and Earlier*, published in 1922, 'there are some who feel . . . that comment on where the world stands is very much the reverse of needless in these disordered years of our prematurely afflicted century : that amendment and not madness lies that way. And looking down the future these few hold fast to the same : that whether the human and kindred animal races survive till the exhaustion or destruction of the globe, or whether these races perish and are succeeded by others before that conclusion comes, pain to all upon it, tongued or dumb, shall be kept down to a minimum by loving-kindness operating through scientific knowledge, and actuated by the modicum of free will conjecturally possessed by organic life when the mighty necessitating forces—unconscious or other—that have "the balancings of the clouds" happen to be in equilibrium, which may or may not be often.'

But how is 'pain to be kept down to a minimum?' What can man do if his life is such as has been described, and if the development of his mental powers can do no more than show him the tragedy of his own existence?

Descartes and Spinoza identified the Will with judgment. Man's duty was to know and then to act in the light of his knowledge. Thus by his capacity to judge he could distinguish good and evil, and modify his actions towards his own betterment, in short, become a different person; he must first know a thing to be good and then will it. On the other hand, Schopenhauer said —and it would seem that Mr. Hardy takes the same view—that every man is what he is through Will and his character is original; through knowledge he may come to know in the course of his experience what he is; in other words, he may learn his own character. Accordingly, a man's duty is to know his own character, and though he cannot change that character in any of its fundamental faults or qualities, he can modify the direction of its efforts. To use a psychological term, he can sublimate its baser elements. This is the best hope of man; that he know himself, his own strength and his own weakness, and that he conduct his life so that there may be the least friction (for some there must always be) between the Will in him and his own consciousness and understanding. 'All that we can do is to avoid those circumstances likely to excite the evil tendencies in our nature, from which it follows that happiness consists in adapting our environment to the character which we know.'[6] It was in his failure to do this that the tragedy of Michael Henchard's life lies. On the other hand, Elizabeth Jane, in the same book, after the struggles of her early life reached the calmer waters of self-knowledge:

> 'As the lively and sparkling emotions of her early married life cohered into an equable serenity, the finer movements of her nature found scope in discovering to the narrow-lived ones around her the secret (as she had once learnt it) of making limited opportunities endurable; which she deemed to consist in the cunning enlargement, by a species of microscopic treatment, of those minute forms of satisfaction that offer themselves to everybody not in positive pain; which, thus handled, have much of the same inspiring effect upon life as wider interests cursorily embraced.'

It is but right to conclude this attempt to extract the philosophy of Mr. Hardy from his works as poet and novelist by stating that he himself has often said that any doctrines put forward in any work of his 'are but tentative, and are advanced with but little eye to a systematized philosophy.' In other words, he is essentially an artist, and not a philosopher.

[6] Hedgecock, *op. cit.* p. 388.

ROY MCKAY.

THE TASK OF MODERN CHURCHMEN

By the Rev. VERNON F. STORR, M.A., Canon of Westminster.

'Jesus saith unto him, I am the Way, and the Truth, and the Life' (*St. John* xiv, 6).

THESE words take us right into the very heart of Christianity. They show us a Person as the centre of the religion, and present that Person under three aspects. First, He is the *Way*. Way means something far more comprehensive than example; it suggests a road running on to a goal, life's growing purpose, God's plan for each one of His children. Secondly, He is the *Truth*. Truth is an organic whole, which finds in Him its focus-point of unity. Thirdly, He is the *Life;* and we are reminded that Christianity is no mere system of abstract truths or principles, but a creative source of life and power. Under that large word 'life' you can sum up all Christ's redemptive work. It was His own word, if the author of the Fourth Gospel has reported Him correctly when he makes Him say, 'I am come that they may have life and may have it abundantly.' The core of Christian discipleship is loyalty to a Person, made possible for the disciple by the communication of that Person's life-giving energies.

The statement 'I am the way, and the truth, and the life' is clear and definite, yet its truth is not contained within hard and rigid boundaries. It is an intensely personal statement, and for that very reason is coloured with something of the elusiveness of personality. You cannot measure personality by geometric rule. A person always succeeds in evading our formulas, for he is always in the making, never made. And though I am not suggesting that Jesus Christ is in the making, a growing Christ, I do most emphatically affirm that our understanding of Him and His teaching is in the making. Whether you look to the race, or the Church, or the individual, only a little of His way has been trodden, only a fragment of His truth has been grasped, we have absorbed only a portion of His life. The fact that way, truth, life (let us say roughly morality, philosophy, religion) are presented by Christianity in personalized form, and as gathering round One Figure conceived as the meeting-point

of the human and the divine, warns us, because personality is an expanding thing, everywhere to make ample room for future growth. Christ stands above and beyond our definitions of Him. His truth, partaking of His own creativeness, is far richer than our credal expressions of it. We need the warning to allow for future growth. It is so difficult as we grow older to keep fresh and living and responsive to the call of new truth. We tend to rest on our oars, both intellectually and morally, and as we rest we begin to grow stiff and are disinclined for further exercise.

Part of the wonder of Christianity lies just here in its combination of certainty with uncertainty. 'I am the way.' It is certain that, if there is any divine purpose in the world at all, it is somehow bound up with Christ. Yet what individual can tell, till the growing years bring proof of it, what the way will be for him? So it is with 'I am the truth.' If there is a system (it is almost too rigid a term) of divine truth (and the rationality of the universe forbids us to doubt it), if there is an answer to Pilate's question, 'What is truth?' that truth, and so the answer to the question, is assuredly to be found in vital connexion with Jesus Christ. Yet how Christ's truth refuses to be rounded off in a definition, will not crystallize itself in a deposit, is like a jewel which, shift your angle of vision ever so little, shows you a new shaft of light.

Is not this the lesson which to-day we have to press home to men's minds, that Christ's truth is an ever-growing thing? With what force at this present time does His parable of the new wine come to us! You put fresh wine into old wine-skins and the ferment of the grape bursts the skins. God's new wine is all astir in our wine-skins to-day. It is one of His great creative moments; one of those moments which challenge traditional usages everywhere, and should send us to our knees in prayer for vision and wisdom. Is not this true that to-day, as never before since those very early days when Christianity broke upon a tired world with all the freshness of a Galilean spring-time, we are called, almost in every sphere, to make a new orientation; to be wisely creative; to listen to a divine voice calling to reconstruction? And does not the divine call come in this form to the Church? Does it not say, 'Show that your old tradition is living truth. Show that Christ's truth is of a piece with all truth wherever it

be found? Show that there can be no final antagonism between His claim to be the Truth and the rest of the knowledge which the Spirit of Truth is so richly revealing?'

This Churchmen's Union is entering, if I mistake not, upon its most fruitful era. An immense work lies before its members. To describe that work in any fulness would be to write a complete diagnosis of the temper of our age. I will merely mention a point or two.

(*a*) First, do we all realise how much spade-work has yet to be done in the matter of teaching the Bible? How much does the average churchman know about the constructive side of Biblical criticism? Practically nothing; yet he can have no intelligent faith unless he does. In how many schools is the Bible properly taught? Yearly thousands of children in the elementary schools are sent out to the work of their lives with no view of the Bible as a whole, and with entirely wrong views about the inspiration of its writers. We are manufacturing little atheists and agnostics, and then we wonder that the churches do not attract the people! Once more, how many people who do read their Bibles, and perhaps have some idea of what the scholars have done, have really adjusted their ideas of God to the newer views? Very few. Their intellectual conversion is only skin-deep. But to have wrong or distorted ideas about God is to have an unsound foundation for all thought.

(*b*) Take the thought of God of which I am speaking. There is no question more earnestly and insistently asked by those in the younger generation who are thinking seriously than this: How may we think rightly of God? What a magnificent opportunity for a Christian teacher to present the Christian point of view, and to show that, whatever God may be, at His centre is Christ and all for which Christ stands. There is sore need for showing that we must take our standard for measuring God, if I may be allowed the expression, from Jesus Christ. Christianity says that God is revealed in supreme degree in Jesus. People do not carry out the full implication of that in their thought of God. They do not put the lamp in the centre of the room, but away in some corner, and of course half the room is in obscurity. We need both to clear away obsolete conceptions of God and to emphasize Christ's thought of God as that which

shall be determinative for all our theology. Our thought of God is rapidly changing with the growth of knowledge. Men need guidance here more than anywhere.

(*c*) At this moment perhaps the most pressing duty is to counter the reactionary tendencies of a vigorous and enthusiastic group of churchmen by showing that, while Christianity grows out of the past, it grows, and is essentially a religion of advance. It looks forward to the unfolding of a richer truth, not backward to a tradition presented as incapable of modification. Christianity indeed looks backward, but to a Person, who is essentially creative, whose teaching requires in each age to be reinterpreted. The term 'modernist' has become a convenient missile to hurl at the head of a theological opponent. How many of those who so hurl it have ever studied Church history? What is the story of Christianity in its intellectual aspect but the story of truth gradually winning its way through the centuries? The sands of time are strewn with the wreckage of old beliefs, once tenaciously held, which a growing knowledge has shown to be no longer truths in the form in which men so passionately clung to them. The heterodoxy of one age, it has been well said, becomes the orthodoxy of the next age. So it will be in the struggle on which we are now entering. God will take care of His truth. Our task is, with charity and reverence for the past, to check reactionary tendencies where we can, not by simply abusing them, but by presenting a richer and more living truth. What is at stake, let us remember, is truth, and what is largely characteristic of the present temper is the readiness to accept 'what helps' as a substitute for 'what is true.' The upheaval caused by the war has provided a soil in which an uncritical emotionalism thrives readily and produces its rich crop of superstitions. The cure is a sounder education. A large number of people may not be ready to do much reading or thinking for themselves, but they are willing to be taught. Reports coming in from various quarters prove that it is possible to secure keen and appreciative audiences for lectures on theological problems. What has been done already in this direction is full of promise for the future. We are, I believe, at the beginnings of a new movement, which in the next decade will reveal more clearly its character. It will be marked by a desire to be synthetic and comprehensive; by an insistence that tradition shall

prove itself to be living truth before it is accepted; by a refusal to press the antithesis of sacred and secular; by that temper of expectation which recognises that God is always creating and always revealing Himself afresh. Can there be any more inspiring task than humbly to be a 'fellow-worker' with God in making known the richness of His truth?

(*d*) It was wise and opportune to have made the subject of psychology a central subject at the last annual conference of this Union. I have often wondered whether one of the most subtle and powerful attacks upon the Christian religion is not coming from the psychological quarter. No doubt much of recent psychology is purely tentative, and its conclusions will not stand the test of time or criticism. But what of its method? How will it affect the average person, who is unversed in philosophy, and who perhaps cannot give good reasons for the faith which is in him? What he sees is an apparently successful attempt to explain religious beliefs and religious experience by reducing them to something else, to something simpler. The life of conscious will and mind is presented as an outgrowth from an unconscious which controls it. Beliefs are explained as due to 'complexes,' or to deep-rooted hereditary forces and tendencies; religious experience is interpreted as being due to auto-suggestion. Such at least is the impression which the plain man is likely to receive. For him, 'to explain' too often becomes 'to explain away.' Objectivity in religion vanishes; what is purely subjective takes its place. Religion becomes a man-made thing; not perhaps made by the priests in their own interest, as an earlier hostile criticism maintained, but made by the believer himself in his own interest, for his own peace of mind and self-protection, and to ensure a tolerable balance among the contending forces of his personality. I believe that the apologist for Christianity will have to reckon very seriously with this psychological attack, judging by the general interest which the subject is arousing and by the large sale which any kind of book on these themes obtains.

I might run on to unendurable length by mentioning special features of our age which have points of contact with the coming reconstruction of theology; but I will not do so. Instead, as I bring this sermon to an end, I should like to emphasize the wisdom shown by those who drew up the formularies of the

Church of England. Everywhere they avoid the error of over-definition, and show that they had a vision of the largeness of truth. In his recent charge, published under the title *The Church of England*, the Bishop of Gloucester writes as follows:

> 'We get no authority, either from the Bible itself or from our English Church for imposing an elaborate system of doctrine, or an exact acquaintance with theological definition, or a particular form of church order, or even a rigid code of ethics, as necessary in any sense for salvation.' Again he writes: 'Certainly the Bible is not infallible; equally true is it that no creed, no definition, no theologian, no period in the Church, no council can make any such claim. All these represent just the best interpretation of the Christian faith possible at that day and suited to the needs of that day.' And he goes on to point out how this absence of dogmatic infallibility is in accord with the temper of the Gospels, and how seldom in the words of Jesus we find 'those clear, definite propositions which might form the basis of dogmatic statement.'

This means that the traditional appeal to Scripture by the Church of England in proof of her teaching governs, not only the case of particular doctrines, but is based on a sound appreciation of the method of Jesus Himself. Not rule, but principle, characterized His teaching. Fundamental spiritual principles such as He ennunciated are by their very nature creative. Spirit makes its own appropriate environment, and then destroys it to create a better. The very genius of Christianity is such that it lends itself at any one moment to different expressions, and continually to new and richer interpretation.

If the term had been in existence, our Lord Himself would have been called a Modernist by the religious leaders of His day. In His attitude to ecclesiastical tradition, in His attitude to the Jewish past, in his vision of a guiding Spirit of Truth who would gradually lead into all truth, we see the cardinal example of what a true modernism means. He 'spake with authority,' and for all Christians His authority is paramount. But the nature of it has to be determined by reverent enquiry; and what He said, and what it means, has also to be determined in the same way. If truth is one, the spiritual truth which He taught has to be related to all truth everywhere. There are no water-tight compartments in knowledge. Least of all can religion, which is the crown of life, be isolated, save at grave cost to itself.

The healthy and natural conservatism of men in matters of religion makes them afraid of new truth, or of the re-presenta-

tion of old truth. But there is nothing to fear. The historic religion of Christianity will not be reduced to mere ideas; nor will the spiritual values which have gathered round the Person and work of Christ be lost. Nor, above all, will the new synthesis, whose advent is as sure as the sunrise, put Christ in any lower place than He now holds. Fashions of thought change, modes of expression become antiquated, but only because God is giving a richer revelation of truth. May God keep us free from intellectual pride and conceit, give us true reverence for the past, the temper of glad expectancy which waits humbly upon Him; and, above all, loyalty to Jesus Christ as to One who can be completely trusted, and who has already proved Himself in our lives to be Master, Friend, Saviour, Inspirer.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE OXFORD MOVEMENT

I.

Hardly anything in the history of English religion has exerted a greater fascination than the Oxford Movement. Its power of attraction has reached far beyond the Anglican communion. Non-conformists and even foreigners have come under its spell. The most complete history of it has been written by M. Thureau-Dangin, a French Catholic, and the best critical account of the period of the Tracts has just come from a Swedish Lutheran, Dr. Yngve Brilioth[1]. No more apt application could be needed of a generalization of Professor Raleigh's: 'The world avenges itself on those men of genius who try to convert it to their doctrines by forgetting their doctrines and falling in love with themselves.'[2] It follows consequently that both the Tractarians and their heirs have seldom been surveyed critically. Such grotesque performances as Walter Walsh's *Secret History of the Oxford Movement* have only added to their victims' prestige. This universal rsepect is a striking testimony to the abiding worth of integrity, high-mindedness, culture, devotion and disinterestedness. For those were the qualities of the men who began the Movement; they are enshrined in the moral beauty of Dean Church's history of the years 1833-1845.

II.

The Oxford Movement itself, that is the events and persons of which Newman was the centre between the years 1833 and 1845, is comparatively easy to analyse and value. The later developments offer a highly complicated series of problems. The issue of the latter would be to determine the relationship of twentieth century Anglo-Catholicism not only to the Oxford Movement but to Anglicanism as a whole, a work still to be attempted.

The Tractarians themselves dated their association for a definite object from Keble's Assize Sermon at St. Mary's, Oxford, on 14th of July 1833, the subject of which was inspired by the Government's proposals to reduce

[1] *The Anglican Revival.* Longmans (1925). Price, 18/-. [2] *Some Authors*, p. 308.

the number of the Irish sees. The purpose that Keble there brought to a head was the defence of the Church. But what escapes most historians of the Movement is the fact that the inspiring motive was hostility to reform. The Church had definitely opposed the Reform Bill in 1832. Only a single bishop, Blomfield of London, had supported its first reading, and he had abstained from voting. The Irish Church Bill which Keble envisaged as an act of national apostasy was a small and temperate attempt to deal with ancient abuses. In the Church of Ireland at that time it was possible for a clergyman to hold a living worth £1,000 a year for ministering to a parish in which there was neither church, parsonage, nor Protestant parishioner.[3] What alone raised the Oxford Movement from the level of obstructionist reaction was the character of the men who led it.

Their remedy was to rally round the Church, recognize the divine authority the Church possessed, and permit divine power to work through the appointed channels. The appeal was to the clergy to realise themselves as instruments of divine grace. The vital dogma of the Oxford Movement thus became the Apostolic Succession. The primitive form of this doctrine had been that a succession of holders of the same see, reaching back to an apostolic founder, guaranteed the authenticity of the teaching of that see. This doctrine was now presented in a modified and less rational form. A succession of consecrators and consecrated, irrespective of see or jurisdiction, mechanically preserved the existence of the Church. The Church thus rested on order rather than on doctrine or conduct. A result of this view was that a Lutheran was consecrated bishop to superintend Anglicans and Protestants in Jerusalem, and some Anglicans were satisfied. Newman, however, saw in this application of the theory that the theory itself was inadequate. He turned elsewhere to seek the true notes of the Church. Newman's protest against the Jerusalem bishopric in 1841 marks the end of the first phase of the Oxford Movement.

This first phase which propounded the Anglican doctrine of the Apostolic Succession was the characteristic one and, in review, the least attractive one. It is the phase which has left permanent marks on the English Church. In part the theological method out of which this doctrine arose was the genuine Anglican tradition of respect for early Christian custom as distinct from the Protestant appeal to Scripture alone. It carried on Jewel's reference to the first six centuries for what was of obligation. But it also tended to return upon itself. The older Anglican tradition did not preclude experiment, little as it attempted it. The Oxford application of the Anglican ideal concentrated on the past with the enthusiasm of the antiquary. Thus, while the Oxford Movement raised the dignity of the ministry, fostered the love of historical continuity, and encouraged historical (as distinct from speculative and critical) theology, it stimulated also the vices of those qualities, sacerdotalism which might at any time become mechanical and was always pretentious, and an antiquarian habit which regarded the backward look as the only one which would see Truth.

III.

This static view of the Church could not hold the brighter spirits. From outside the Movement as early as 1833 the hostile pen of Arnold of Rugby had by anticipation denied the validity of the apostolic claim: 'Bishops confer a legal qualification for the ministry, not a real one, whether natural or supernatural.' The true ministry was a gift of God upon the minister's 'own prayers and exertions.'[4] Before 1845 Ideal Ward and Newman himself had modified their view of the Church to one not far from Arnold's,

[3] See Greville, *Memoirs* III, p. 9. [4] *Principles of Church Reform*, 1833.

utterly different as were their approaches. The Church is now for them the saints, the body of the elect. The true Church is the church which produces saints. Ward and Newman looked at the Church of England and were convinced, Ward somewhat cynically, Newman sorrowfully, that it failed to supply this note. They turned from the mother they knew, and sought it in the mother they knew not. In this passion for holiness lies the secret of the fascination of the Oxford Movement over those who repudiate its doctrines. The desire for sanctity marks all men of high religious ideals, Wesleyans, Tractarians, Evangelicals. The view of the Church for which the Oxford Movement worked is not the only scheme for creating the note of sanctity, nor indeed is it established that the Oxford scheme creates the note of sanctity at all. Men of deep worth and holiness developed the Tractarian theology. But we may not infer that the Tractarian theology will by its own merit produce men of deep worth and holiness. The personality of its leaders was the important factor in the Oxford Movement and in its sequels. These men have won admiration and sympathy for themselves but not for their principles. The Oxford Movement was essentially clerical. Its influence in parishes has been invariably determined by the personality of the parish priest. The people have tolerated the system because they respected the man. At the same time even as a purely clerical influence the Oxford Movement has been credited with achievements which it cannot justly claim. It is no disparagement to the men of the Movement to say that popular histories of the Anglican Revival are in the habit of exaggerating the effects of the Movement in matters like parochial and social work, ecclesiastical architecture and music, church polity and reform. The Movement planted in the clergy a lofty sense of their vocation and raised the standard at least of their devotional life. But history has yet to estimate the part played in the English Church Revival of the nineteenth century by purely secular influences, the spread of education, the Romantic Movement in literature and art, or the democratic spirit which dominated the political field. It is well to mark and avoid the tendency to attribute to the Oxford Movement progress in the Church of England due to quite different causes. The picture of the Oxford Movement rescuing England from pluralist vicars ministering in dirty and neglected churches cannot seriously be entertained. It was not the Oxford Movement that did this but an increase in the standards of comfort and enlightenment among the middle and working classes.

It would appear on review that the Oxford Movement took two lines, or perhaps, more exactly, embraced two parties. The one found light in a high but static view of the Church, the dangers of which were antiquarianism and mechanism. The other, a more progressive element and for the most part a later one, psychologically more correct, found scope for feeling as well as order. But their eyes were fixed not like the Tractarians, immovably on the primitive Church, but on a fanciful image of the Church of the Middle Ages. This led them in Newman's steps to Rome. Conscious of the weakness of mere antiquarianism and alive to the value of spiritual experiment, they substituted for legitimate experiment the guidance of Rome. Their relationship to Rome is not, however, Newman's. Apparently they see the key to sanctity not in the living body of Rome but in the gesticulations of that body separated from its life. It is the real weakness of the Oxford Movement in all its phases and among all its heirs that it has failed to be conscious of the English Church as possessing its life in itself. Instead it has sought life either from a past so remote as to have lost vitality, or by transfusion from an alien body.

E. J. Martin.

THE CHURCH OF THE SPIRIT.*

Professor Peabody is probably best known to readers in this country by his book *Jesus Christ and the Social Question*, the first of his series of admirable studies in the applicability of New Testament teaching to modern life, of which the present volume is the last. It contains the substance of three Hibbert Lectures delivered in Manchester College in April, and is a most useful addition to that ever-increasing literature of very varied value which treats of religion as a matter of experience and of life, in comparison or in contrast with religious organizations and institutions. The book will make refreshing reading to those who are wearied or depressed by the incessant strife of tongues, though it is the work of a man who has not been able, and who would not desire, altogether to avoid that strife.

It must not be supposed that when Dr. Peabody contrasts the Church of Authority with the Church of the Spirit he is merely attempting to revive the old and vacuous idea of an 'Invisible Church' of true believers. He is, on the contrary—and it is the burden of the whole book—concerned to emphasize a visible fact, and one which, with the growth of liberal thought, is becoming increasingly apparent; namely, that deeper than all the differences between the various institutional and dogmatic churches, is the cleavage between those who, whatever be their institutional allegiance, are primarily concerned with Christianity as an institution, and those who find its essential character in an experience, and in a way of life to be lived in the world of men. For the former the Church must be the Church of Authority: it is for the latter that Dr. Peabody uses the term, which is a loose one, 'the Church of the Spirit.' To many people any such distinction is non-existent. They value the Church of Authority because it promotes the life of the spirit; often indeed such a Church has been the channel in and through which the life of the Spirit has become real to them, though in other cases the distinction is so sharply felt that for many a serious-minded life there may ensue 'a curious sense of divided allegiance or of unharmonized experience.' In the main, spiritual religion tends to break the barrier of credal and institutional religion and to create a unity of the Spirit which is the bond of peace. This is not a remote ideal, but a practical and a growing reality. The inference is not that creeds should be scrapped and institutions abandoned, but rather that their symbolic and secondary character should be frankly recognized so that we may the more freely compare spiritual things with spiritual. Lives united in the Church of the Spiirt, while 'they may tolerate divided organizations as providing for diversity of temperament, or habit of mind, they leave the boundaries of such organizations as unguarded as the three thousand miles of frontier separating Canada from the United States, with no protecting fort, or aggressive ship, or threatening gun.'

It will be seen that in regard to questions of finally authoritative creeds, formulae or institutions, this book is a defence of the Liberal or Modernist attitude at its best. For many true Christians, as for Cardinal Newman, Liberalism means 'false liberty of thought, or the exercise of thought upon matters in which, from the constitution of the human mind, thought cannot be brought to a successful issue. Liberalism then is the mistake of subjecting to human judgment those revealed doctrines which are in their nature beyond and independent of it, and of claiming to detrmine on intrinsic grounds the truth and value of propositions which rest for their

* *The Church of the Spirit*, by Francis Greenwood Peabody, Plummer Professor of Christian Morals (Emeritus) in Harvard University. The Macmillan Company, 1925. Price 7s. 6d. net.

reception simply on the external authority of the Divine Word.' If one is so constituted as to feel the need of a further divine revelation that there are *any* such propositions so guaranteed, or to ask by what right any matter of which the human mind can take cognizance may be withdrawn from the exercise of the thought of that human mind upon it, the Church of Authority can give neither satisfaction nor answer. And this is increasingly the atttude of the thinking part of the modern world, and the temper of the unthinking part of it. The Church of the Spirit makes no such demands. It realizes that about the intellectual formulation of the ultimate questions relating to God and man, as of the relation of Jesus Christ to God and man, great difficulties will remain until man reaches the point, if such there be, when all truths will be reconciled; and it can tolerate differences about the meaning of divine revelations among those who live the life which it is the purpose of such revelations to foster. It may often happen that in the intellectual atmosphere of the modern world, 'many men of considerable intellectual activity, wearied with the questionings and scepticisms they cannot resolve, fall back upon external authority as the only mode of silencing the reason and satisfying the conscience,' a state of mind generally reached by an unconscious rather than by a conscious process. Moreover it is one not without its advantages, though one confronted by grave difficulties, not the least of which is the fact that authoritative Christian apologetic 'has at times reached such elaboration of statement concerning the nature and mission of Jesus Christ that it becames more than questionable whether the founder of Christianity could meet the tests of membership proposed by his church, or be fairly entitled to the name of Christian.'

Professor Peabody traces, though only in outline, the history of the Church of the Spirit. It is largely a history of rise and fall. 'The history of spiritual religion has by its very nature a quality of intermittency and fragmentariness which is in manifest contrast with the uninterrupted and verifiable programme of the organized Church.' But though there have been ebb-tides as well as flood-tides of spiritual religion, Dr. Peabody's admirable survey abundantly shows the continuity and the persistence of the Platonic, liberal, and mystical traditions in Christianity, and the glorious contribution these have made to its life in the world. This section of the book is perhaps the most valuable part of it. But the dangers which beset this type of religion are no less real than those which beset the Church of Authority, and Professor Peabody's chapter on 'The Sins of the Church of the Spirit' is a serious warning against any form of complacent liberalism. Moral delinquencies and spiritual defection are more dangerous than theological errors and misdirected metaphysics. Spiritual illiteracy and spiritual complacency are terms as disastrous in their significance as unpleasant in their sound; while intolerance in spiritual things is much more hateful than the intolerance which has too often marked the Church of Authority. It is, as Dr. Peabody well says, a 'sin not always left behind as one escapes from the bondage of conformity into the freedom of the spirit.'

Those who know other works of Dr. Peabody will not imagine that his conception of the Church of the Spirit is of a society of people so occupied with the pursuit of personal experience in the sphere of the spirit as to neglect the performance of duty in the world. He fully realizes that man is incapable of a purely individual perfection; and as the great masters of the spiritual life have almost invariably been extremely active in the world of affairs, so there are great tasks awaiting the Church of the Spirit militant; only by the fulfilling of these can the Church become triumphant, not in some future world, but in the present.

What shall be the end of these things? What will be the practical consequence of the increasing clearness of the issue between spiritual and dogmatic Christianity? Will those who maintain the liberal tradition forsake their separate communions and unite in a Church of the Spirit? Although in some respects Dr. Peabody would regard this as a 'fortunate consummation,' he urges that it would probably easily result in a new Church of Authority which, 'though free from external control, would not be free from internal politics and compulsions.' More desirable is the permeation of the churches of authority by the church of the spirit, and this is just what can never be done once and for all, but needs to be done continually and in every generation anew. J.S.B.

THE LITERARY GENIUS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.*

Despite the great number of books published, it is not often that one meets a more delightful combination of keen insight, fair judgment and attractive style than is exhibited by Mr. Sands' *Literary Genius of the Old Testament.** It is the work of a practical teacher and is arranged in the form of lessons. It presumes throughout that the Bible is in the hands of the teacher.

The author begins with a short account of the Hebrew people, and then gives a summary of the development of their literature. He deals next with the Art of Story-Telling in the O.T., the dramatic power of those stories and their parabolic character. He then turns from prose and poetry, and deals with similes, allegories, imagery, diction, parellelism, etc.

It is difficult to imagine anyone interested in literature not finding this book full of interest. It is, we venture to think, the kind of book which would please Professor Quiller-Couch, and which teachers of English literature in the higher forms of schools will value.

The book is not, however, entirely literary: there is much moral and spiritual teaching in it. It shews, for instance, that the unity of the various books of the O.T. is found in Israel's relation to Jehovah.

Mr. Sands' book bears on its title page the significant quotation from J. R. Green, 'England became the people of a book, and that book was the Bible.' This is ceasing to be the case, and as a consequence we are as a nation poorer in every way. If our clergy cannot restore the Bible to its commanding place in English life, perhaps the school teachers will be able to do so.

The following passage, chosen almost at random, shows the way in which the Jews' regard for humanity was fostered and exemplified by their religion. A very different picture this, and surely a truer one, than that often painted by Anti-Semitic writers!

> 'From these images, and from the attention given to the stranger, the orphan, and the widow, in the Mosaic Law, we can see the close connexion between the Hebrews' conception of God and their social ideals. The Old Testament steadily insists on this view of God and this duty of man, of which the outcome is that the weak shall not go to the wall. 'Do justice' is coupled with 'love mercy,' a combination much softer and kindlier than the cold and stern elevation of justice in Plato's ideal state or in Roman practice. This protection of the helpless because of their helplessnesss anticipates the notions of modern chivalry. There are parallel ideas in other nations' laws and literature, but no other people gave them such prominence. They are the

* *The Literary Genius of the Old Testament*, by P. C. Sands. Oxford University Press, 1924. Price 4s. 6d. net.

kernel of the Old Testament revelation. . . . The gods of other nations demanded sacrifice; the Lord Jehovah wanted "mercy and not sacrifice. . . ." It was not surprising that the people who grasped this so clearly and produced such precious imagery should have been chosen to give birth to Christianity' (p. 67).

One aspect which this citation will not illustrate is the exceedingly able manner in which Mr. Sands contrives to indicate the approximate date and place in the nation's history of many of the passages which he quotes.

A useful addition to this volume would be an index of Scriptural passages.

J.D.C.

THE CLERICAL VADE MECUM.*

It was Bishop Stubbs of Oxford who said, 'There is one book which all we bishops have to study. It begins with B. That book is *Bradshaw*.' In these days of petrol this is no longer the case. The road-map is rapidly replacing *Bradshaw*. For clergymen of the Anglican Communion to-day the indispensable book, after Bible and Prayer Book, begins with C. It is *Crockford's Clerical Directory*. Every bishop, archdeacon, rural dean, and diocesan registrar has to consult *Crockford* frequently, and every vicar and curate, however humble, must consult it before the chief movements in his official career. *Crockford's* fifty-fifth issue,* being the issue for 1925, published by the Oxford University Press, excels even its predecessors in fulness of knowledge and convenience of arrangement. *Crockford* tells its reader everything he ought to desire to know about a clergyman, except whether he is married. It seems a pity that this could not also be given, as in *Who's Who*.

Crockford's Preface, which is a sort of Annual Church Register, intrigues its reader. It is not simply anonymous, it is impersonal; and so impartial that it might have been written by one of the Primate's chaplains.

It contains much information in a succinct form. It states that the total number of names upon the electoral rolls is 3,537,020, almost exactly ten *per cent.* of the nation. The Diocese of Manchester stands highest (318,550); London follows with 166,991. An amazing drop! This is 4·6 *per cent.* of London's population. The four highest diocesan per centages are Hereford 27·6, Salisbury 20·2, Bath and Wells 20, St. Edmundsbury 18·6. This gives the impression that the rural clergy are more efficient than their urban brethren, or at least more successful.

On Prayer-Book revision *Crockford* is interesting. The Editor remarks that:

> 'It would perhaps be rash to say that the end of Prayer-Book Revision (or, to speak more accurately, the appearance of an Authorized Revised Prayer-Book) is yet in sight. There are indications that some of the laity are waxing impatient at what seems to them the unreasonably prolonged character of the proceedings. And they are disposed to attribute the delay to the excessive facetiousness of the Clergy.'

Our own experience is that the zest of some of the laity for Prayer-Book revision has become much less keen since they have got some inkling of the kind of Prayer-Book revision which threatens them.

Crockford gives valuable information about ordinands:

> 'We have no statistics before us as to the number of men who were admitted to Holy Orders during the current year, but we fear

* *Crockford's Clerical Directory*, 1925. Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. Price £2 2s. net.

that it was slightly less than that of the previous year. The new entries do not yet balance the losses by death and retirement, to say nothing of the deficiency of the last ten years.'

The Preface adds that 1,155 Service Candidates have been ordained under the auspices of the Central Advisory Council, and of them 627 have been assisted financially. It cannot be sufficiently impressed on Churchmen that, while an unrevised Prayer-Book and Hymn-Book and obscurantist preaching and teaching keep back a number of the ablest men from Holy Orders, there is a body of men of at least mediocre abilities, who would do good work in the Ministry of the Church, who are kept back by the lack of financial resources to meet the expenses of preparation.

N OR M.*

Mr. Basil Redlich, who has already given religious teachers an admirable handbook in *Old Testament Stories and how to teach them,* has recently produced an interesting volume on the history and use of the Church Catechism. Not a few will question the utility of writing for students and teachers the history of a document which is for various reasons in growing disfavour with large classes of Englishmen, whether Catholic or Communist. We heard but this week of a parish priest who presented thirteen candidates for Confirmation none of whom had received instruction in the Church Catechism on account of its defective sacramental doctrine. Let us hasten to add that we belong to that small body which regards the Catechism as an excellent manual of moral and religious teaching—equally valuable for future journalists and Labour leaders as for film-actresses and sportsmen. Nothing could be better than its summary of Duty towards God and towards my Neighbour, or its explanation of the Lord's Prayer. Not less valuable though more limited in range is its summary of the Apostles' Creed and its doctrine of the Sacraments.

The opening section of the Catechism, it is true, might be usefully simplified in harmony with its interpretation in Canon Robinson's admirable volume *The Church Catechism Explained;* also the word *spiritual* might be substituted for *ghostly,* and the Decalogue given in the abbreviated form used in the First Prayer Book of Edward VI. Statements about a jealous God and a universe created in six days require too much explanation to-day. But apart from these small changes, the Catechism seems to us to require less emendation than almost any other portion of our Prayer Book.

There is nothing in the Catechism which has more puzzled students than the answer to the first question, 'N or M.' It used to be explained than N stood for Name or *Nomen,* and that M was intended as a double N and so stood for Names or *Nomina.* There is, however, one fatal objection to this interpretation of M. The giving of more than one Christian name to a child did not begin in England before the eighteenth century. Other teachers have explained N or M as representing such typical names for boys and girls as Nicholas and Mary. Here the interpretation of M is strong, while that of N is weak. John or William, not Nicholas, are typical boys' names. Mr. Redlich shews conclusively that N or M are simply letters of the alphabet meaning *so and so.* In Mayer's Catechism the answer is 'I or F.' In Nicholson's Catechism it is 'A, B, C, etc.'

Mr. Redlich discusses with equal acumen the meaning of the phrase 'Years of discretion.' According to the Canon 61 of 1605, all ought to be

* *The Church Catechism, its History and Meaning,* by E. Basil Redlich. Macmillan, 1924. Price 4s. 6d. net.

communicants by the age of 16. But inasmuch as confirmations were triennial this would mean that confirmation would often take place between 12 and 13. Mr. Redlich holds, it is of interest to note, that it is the function of the curate, not the bishop, to decide what is the competent age in the case of each candidate. There is one point Mr. Redlich does not consider in this connection, and that is that the modern boy is much younger for his age than the Tudor boy. In Tudor times boys came up to the University at 14 or younger. Even John Keble entered Oxford, we think we have seen it stated, at the age of 14. Certainly 'the judicious Hooker' was an undergraduate at that age—and no doubt a very responsible person. The modern boy of fourteen is, and most happily, very much of a child. Experienced parish priests are aware that the older the candidates the smaller the proportion of lapses.

H.D.A.M.

CORRESPONDENCE

A RATIONAL UNIVERSE?

SIR, TO THE EDITOR OF *The Modern Churchman.*

May I be allowed to thank Mr. Cross for his courteous answers to what may have appeared somewhat impertinent questions? I asked them because I had drawn the conclusion from his original article that he was not prepared with any answer to them. I cannot say that he has removed that impression. He is involved in a contradiction for which he has offered no solution. (1) If the word 'beginning' has no temporal significance, it means nothing at all, because (2) 'change involves development' and that is certainly a temporal concept. What I am trying to say is this: If the universe as a whole is developing, that implies that the universe as a whole is temporal, because development is essentially a process in time. Mr. Cross seems to be trying to have it both ways. He makes the universe eternal but at the same time says it is developing. In doing this does he not attach purely finite qualities to what is infinite? My purpose in asking the questions I did was to find out how he justifies his position. It seems to me to be one of the many difficulties resulting from the position described by Archdeacon Lilley in his article on Von Hügel. He says of creation that 'the essence of that doctrine was not . . . the non-eternity of matter but the 'createdness' of the universe, its essential dependence in every phase and at every moment of its life upon the Divine Life.' I do not see how the two lives can be separated in that way. If the universe is created it is temporal. But if the doctrine of Immanence is followed to its logical conclusion, 'dependence' becomes identity, for the universe is the flesh and blood of God. Spirit is not the antithesis of matter; it is the inseparable quality of matter's quantity. The spirit that was in Christ is the quality of the universe. All mystics have known this. Angela of Foligno said 'I comprehended all the world . . . and my soul in its exceeding wonder cried out and said 'Behold the world is pregnant with God.'

May I assure you, sir, that it is not in any idle spirit of curiosity that I ask these questions. I am one of many in these days who are seeking a spiritual home. The problems which confront Christianity at this moment are of vital interest to us, but I think we approach them from a diametrically opposite point of view to that of most Modernist clergy. For them, I think it is not unfair to say, the question they inevitably ask themselves is, 'How little need I abandon?' For us the question is, 'What is worth

keeping?' Emphatically one of the things which is not worth keeping is an irrational universe, for it means an 'irruptionist theology.' This is a cardinal point, for it is out of man's reaction to his surroundings that religion is born. On the one hand he is engaged in his external discovery of the rationale of the universe—the Quantity of the universe. On the other hand he grows in intuitive knowledge of absolute value—the Quality of the universe. Out of his reasoned reconciliation, or irrational mixing, of the knowledge gained in these two ways is born his religion. In fact the history of religion is, from one point of view, no more than the story of the disentanglement of the irrational mixture and the gradual substitution of a reasoned reconciliation. It is, then, of paramount importance to have a clear conception of what is involved in the concept of the universe. Must not a first article of faith for Christianity be that it is an all-embracing whole? A unity which is at the same time a Sacrament, a Transcendent God and an Immanent Spirit.

With regard to the third point in question, it is really too large a matter to discuss in a letter; but one sentence of Mr. Cross's I feel I must quote. 'I doubt whether on any other theory a meaning can be attached to the words "praise" and "blame."' On page 73 of your April and May issue Julian of Norwich is quoted as follows: 'Sin is behovable,' and R.D.R. says that this 'Truth has been strikingly confirmed by modern thought and discovery.' So Mr. Cross's criterion for the valuation of rationalist theories was already discredited five hundred years ago. Is this Modernism?

What bitter irony there is in the word 'apologetics.' The future of Christianity must not lie with the faint-hearted who fly to Catholicism as an authoritative refuge from doubts and difficulties, and have to apologise for it. The world of the future will be an educated world and, above all, a world that knows it has evolved and is evolving. We look to the Church of England Modernists to see that Christianity shall be a religion which expresses for future generations the heart and core of their understanding of the universe. A religion which requires no apologetic but manifestly lights the steps of our conscious evolution.

DOUGLAS MARSHALL.

Broughton Sanatorium, Frimley, Surrey.
22nd May, 1925.

SIR,

I would like to offer a few remarks on the correspondence in your columns about the rationality of the universe.

When Mr. Cross arrives at his conclusion that the rationality of the universe involves logical determinism, he appears to get there by defining the rationality of the universe to mean logical determinism. It can, of course, be taken in that sense; but Mr. Cross seems to overlook the fact that he is confronted with alternative definitions of freedom (at least, as applied to God), (1) the choice between different established modes of action, (2) the creation of new modes. He holds that 'if the whole universe has been bound to develop along lines prescribed by the laws of thought, then any free action by God or man is impossible.' Against the tyranny of the contrary supposition (advanced by Descartes) that the laws of thought are themselves determinations of the Divine Will, Geulincx protested soon after it was formulated; and it feels strange to learn that his protest is still being shied at. Perhaps Mr. Cross means that there are no laws of thought, a standpoint which leads us to blank and utter agnosticism. In his letter of April 5th there appears to be a serious misunder-

standing of the scope and functions of mathematics. He says that 'any attempt to build up a system of ethics *more geometrico* is faced with the difficulty of accounting for freewill.' But also any attempt at building up a system of geometry is faced with the difficulty of accounting for the axioms. These are not *a priori* intuitions either of the independently real or of the logically necessary: they are hypothetical assumptions which determine a particular kind of space, and we do not yet know which of them best fits that space which constitutes the theatre of dynamic phenomena. I think Mr. Cross will be rather pleased than otherwise to acknowledge that geometry has an extra-logical basis.

L. W. CARRUTHERS.

25 Hazlemere Park Road, New Barnet, Herts.

[Mr. Cross it at present at the University of Freiburg; hence it has been impossible to secure his reply in time for publication.—ED., M.C.]

SIR,

WHAT BECAME OF THE LORD'S BODY?

A Modernist clergyman recently stated that the Risen Christ was simply a vision. He dismissed the question what became of the Lord's body as something *with which we have no concern*. The italics are mine.

In this context the Lord's body is the Flesh and Blood of Christ Who died on the Cross and was buried in a particular tomb.

There are several reasons why it is a matter of some concern.

Shunting a difficulty is the method of an autocrat or of a child. By over-spiritualising or thinning-out everything that offends us in the Gospels we may be in danger of losing some truth of God.

The term Vision sounds more Scriptural and captivating than the term Ghost; but it means the same thing. Ghosts are common enough; or, if you like, Ghost stories are common enough.

If the Risen Christ was a ghost—or, if you like, was the story of a ghost—it was a most marvellous ghost-story, to change the face of history! *Credat Judaeus!*

The ghost-theory is as ancient as it is facile. It was a first shot at things which would strike Christ's followers in their work-a-day wisdom. So Christ said, 'Handle Me and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see Me have.'

Tens of thousands of modern Spiritists, numbering in their ranks scientists of the highest repute, men with as wide a grasp of the universe as critical Christians have, are convinced of the materialisation of departed spirits.

One hears the twentieth-century Christian exclaiming: 'The risen Christ speaking in a voice that demands for utterance physical vocal organs?' 'Preposterous!'

'Eating broiled fish?' 'Ridiculous!'

'The tale of Thomas probing with his finger the nail-prints in His hands, the hole in His side?' 'Poetry, Symbol, Fiction.'

One hears the twentieth-century Spiritist exclaiming:

'That sort of thing impossible?' Why, it happens; it happens to-day; at happens at our *sèances*. That part of the Gospel we know to be literal fact.'

I cite the Spiritist not because he is a Christian, but because he is not, and because it is a case of the thinking non-Christian convicting the thinking Christian of unbelief.

But the materialised-spirit theory of the Risen Christ gives no solution. The materialised spirit always has a dead body somewhere (which we can

account for); if the Risen Christ was a materialised spirit, He was a materialised spirit without a dead body anywhere.

A medium, too, from whom the spirit draws material, is a necessity for materialisation. But the Gospels give not the slightest indication that St. Peter, or any other friend of Christ, fell into a trance and acted in the capacity of a medium at the Lord's frequent re-appearances.

The Gospels alone answer the question 'What became of the Lord's body? That which was laid in the tomb arose from the tomb, the same body, but mysteriously changed. May we use a modern word, not to alter the fact, but to express the change—etherialised?

Non-normal? Precisely. But it was not the only non-normal thing Christ did. To raise a Lazarus; to still a thunderstorm with a word—these also are non-normal things.

Colerne Rectory, Wilts. H. H. STEPHENS.

SIR,

Mr. Stephens writes to give reasons why it is a matter of concern to know what became of our Lord's body. An analysis of his letter, as far as it permits of analysis, fails to reveal any adequate reasons, but does reveal a fallacy very common in popular apologetics. It is commonly assumed that if the tomb were not empty on the third day this fact must have been known not only to the Christians, but also to their Jewish opponents, as well as to the Romans. It is assumed that all three, from different motives, must have gone to the tomb to verify the report that it was empty. But this assumption begs the very point at issue, for it assumes that belief in the physical resurrection dates from the third day. I endeavoured to show in the article which led to this correspondence that it is probable that St. Paul did not believe in the physical resurrection and that the details about the physical resurrection found in the Gospels represent a later stage in the development of the resurrection story. If this is so, then there was no need for either friend or foe to examine the tomb on the third day, for there was, as yet, no story of a physical resurrection for friend or foe to confirm or to refute. By the time the story of our Lord's physical resurrection arose, it was too late to verify it by an examination of the tomb.

May I add that our belief in the Lord as the living and ever-present Saviour no more depends on what became of His body than it does on what became of the clothes He wore?

JOHN TODD.

Waterstock Rectory, Oxon.

SIR, CHURCH TUTORIAL CLASSES.

Church Tutorial Classes were organized to provide opportunities for the honest and thoroughgoing study, under expert guidance, of the fundamental principles of the Christian faith, of the Bible in the light of modern scholarship, of the origin and history of the Church, of the practical application of Christ's teaching to the life of to-day, and of other religious subjects.

In the winter of 1923-24 there were fourteen classes; in that of 1924-25 there were thirty-four.

Volunteers to act as tutors to additional classes are urgently required.

73 Gordon Mansions, W.C.1. J. W. POVAH.

[We hope members of the Churchmen's Union and readers of the *Modern Churchman* will volunteer to help in this excellent work.—ED., M.C.]